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Burke: Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness

CONSENT SEARCHES AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
REASONABLENESS
Alafair S. Burke*
Abstract
This Article builds on a growing body of scholarship discussing the
role of reasonableness in consent-search doctrine. Although the language
of “voluntary consent” implies a subjective inquiry into the state of mind
of the person granting consent, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
injected an objective standard of reasonableness into its analysis of a
citizen’s consent. Several scholars have characterized the Court’s consent
jurisprudence as focusing not on true voluntariness but on the
reasonableness of police conduct, which they argue is appropriate
because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.”
While the renewed scholarly focus on the role of reasonableness in the
Court’s consent jurisprudence is helpful in explaining the puzzling
disconnect between language and doctrine, much of this current emphasis
has been distorted by the dichotomy between coercion and voluntariness:
Did police use (unreasonable) coercive tactics that would override a
(reasonable) person’s free will? However, the Fourth Amendment’s
default concept of reasonableness is based not on coercion or volition but
on its requirement of a warrant based on probable cause. Typically when
the Court recognizes an exception to the default rule, it grounds that
exception in a concept of reasonableness that requires a weighing of the
governmental interests served by the warrantless conduct against the
level of the intrusion on affected Fourth Amendment interests: liberty and
privacy. Because the Court has relied on the myth of voluntary consent as
a proxy for the warrant and probable cause requirements that normally
define “reasonableness” in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has
bypassed the usual substitute proxy for Fourth Amendment
reasonableness: an express weighing of the governmental and citizen
interests at stake.
This Article engages in the reasonableness inquiry that the Supreme
Court has avoided. Drawing on the Court’s approach to reasonableness in
other Fourth Amendment contexts, this Article first looks to the concept
of “macro reasonableness” to argue that the Court has overestimated the
value of consensual searches to law enforcement and underestimated
their effect on privacy. While the Court has emphasized the value of
consensual searches yielding incriminatory evidence that might go
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undetected absent the consent-search doctrine, many consent searches
serve no government interests at all. Meanwhile the pervasiveness of the
practice imposes tremendous costs to privacy. This Article then seeks to
reshape the consent-search exception, using a requirement of “micro
reasonableness,” to make the doctrine of consent more reflective of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Under this requirement, courts
would examine not only the voluntariness of the consent underlying the
search, but also the government’s reasons for requesting the consent and
the scope of the consent requested.
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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has ever spent a day in a criminal courtroom, walked the
sidewalks of an actively policed neighborhood, or watched an episode of
any police show on television is familiar with this scene: A police officer
initiates a conversation (“How you doing tonight?”), brings the topic
around to criminal activity (“We’re hearing complaints from the
neighborhood about drug activity”), and asks for consent to search (“Okay if I
check that bag, just to make sure you’re not holding?”).
It is difficult to assess the precise number of consent searches conducted
because so many of them go undocumented, especially when they yield
nothing incriminatory. 1 Despite numeric uncertainties, it is clear that
consensual searches permeate real-world policing.2 Multiple scholars have
estimated that consent searches comprise more than 90% of all warrantless
searches by police,3 and that they are “unquestionably” the largest source of
searches conducted without suspicion. 4 And though the premise of the
consent-search doctrine is that people are free to decline, the reality is that
nearly everyone “consents,”5 at least as the Court has defined that term.
1. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 & n.7
(2001) (“There is no national clearinghouse for statistics on the number of times police ask for
consent to search. And obviously, the published cases that raise the issue of consent are only the
tip of the iceberg. For every consent search that ends up in the books, there are likely hundreds
that are never disputed, either because nothing was found or because the defendant plea bargained
and thus no evidentiary issues were litigated, or even, in rare circumstances, because the person
refused consent to search!”).
2. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 317–18 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that the pervasive use of consent
searches by the police “suggests that consent issues are of profound importance in the ‘real world’
of searches and seizures”); 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 16.01 (4th ed. 2006) (providing that consent searches “are a dominant—perhaps
the dominant—type of lawful warrantless search” and anecdotally noting consent-search police
practices performed by police officers); Brian R. Gallini, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: History’s
Unspoken Fourth Amendment Anomaly, 79 TENN. L. REV. 233, 233 (2012) (describing consent
searches as “one of the more popular” methods that officers “walking the beat” may use for
conducting warrantless searches). A search for the term “knock and talk”—law enforcement slang
for approaching a house without a warrant, knocking on the door, and asking to search for
drugs—in Lexis’s “Federal and State Cases, Combined” library returned 1586 court decisions.
LEXISNEXIS, http://www.advance.lexis.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (search for “knock and
talk,” follow the “filters” dropdown menu, select “Jurisdiction,” then select the “All U.S. Federal”
and “All States & Territories” filters).
3. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 317–18 (citing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL.,
THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 21 (1984)); Ric
Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (“Over 90% of warrantless police
searches are accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.”).
4. Gerard E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 235
(2007) (“Next to the pervasive automobile exception to the warrant requirement, consent is
probably the leading justification offered for warrantless searches, and consent is unquestionably
the leading rationale for searches undertaken without particularized probable cause or reasonable
suspicion.”); see Gallini, supra note 2, at 233.
5. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1609, 1662 (2012) (gathering statistics and noting that “people consent so often that it
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The law governing consensual searches suffers from multiple layers
of schizophrenia. On one hand, the Supreme Court treats consent
searches as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement; on the other, it views consensual encounters as completely
beyond the Fourth Amendment’s reach. 6 On one hand, the Court’s
assumption that at least some people may want to assist law enforcement
by granting consent appears sound; on the other, one wonders why
anyone would possibly consent to a search that will implicate him.7 And
perhaps most perplexing of all is the discord between the doctrine and its
application. On one hand, the general principle underlying the doctrine
appears unassailable: Why should courts invalidate police action if the
affected citizen was a voluntary participant? On the other hand, the Court
has been continually willing to see voluntary consent where seemingly no
one else would.8

undermines both the meaningfulness of the consent and the believability that the police are really
respecting the doctrine”); ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, UNIV. OF ILL. CHI.,
ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS ACT 2010 ANNOTATED REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2011),
available at http://www.idot.illinois.gov/Assets/uploads/files/Transportation-System/Reports/Safety/Tr
affic-Stop-Studies/2010/2010%20Illinois%20Traffic%20Stop%20Summary.pdf (reporting that 82% of
drivers consented to a vehicle search when asked); Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of
Robinette on the “Voluntary” Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOW. L.J. 349, 367 (2001)
(finding that more than 88% of drivers gave consent to search when asked before implementation
of a Robinette warning and approximately 92.2% gave consent after the warning); Arrest,
Discipline, Use of Force, Field Data Capture and Audit Statistics Reports and the City Status
Report Covering the Period of January 1, 2006–June 30, 2006, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/special_assistant_for_constitutional_policing/content_basic_view/90
16 (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (containing reports of the numbers of drivers and passengers who
consented to searches). In one six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2006, only three of
16,228 drivers did not grant consent when asked, and 99% of pedestrians consented. Id.
6. See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 16.02, at 247–49 (discussing the
seemingly incongruent rationales undergirding consent-search doctrine).
7. See John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2007) (“How
much of an idiot—how stupid, moronic, imbecilic—would a person carrying a gram of crack
cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really consent—‘freely and
voluntarily’—to being searched by a police officer, knowing full well that such a search would
result inevitably in the discovery of the cocaine and a subsequent arrest?”); Kent Greenfield, Free
Will Paradigms, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 11 (2011) (“If Fourth
Amendment ‘consent’ means anything close to what ‘consent’ means in other contexts, then
perhaps the mere fact that the passengers knew a search would reveal drugs and result in their
arrest is strong evidence that the search was a result of intimidation and pressure rather than
choice.”); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations,
27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 128 (1998) (“It is inherently improbable that criminal suspects voluntarily
would consent to the discovery of the very evidence necessary to seal their legal demise.”);
Strauss, supra note 1, at 211 (describing her students’ “mass incredulity” that people in
possession of contraband consent to searches).
8. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1662 (claiming that “most” people
believe the Supreme Court’s conception of voluntary consent is “wrong”); Simmons, supra note
3, at 774 (describing one of the Supreme Court’s findings of voluntary consent as “absurd”);
Strauss, supra note 1, at 211; Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at
Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 75 (2007).
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The doctrine of Fourth Amendment consent is so schizophrenic that
scholars can hardly use the term “voluntary consent” without qualifying
it. They refer to the “fictions” of consent 9 and voluntariness, 10 dub
consent searches “consent(less),” 11 and insist on placing the words
voluntary and consent in quotation marks.12 Because of the disconnect
many perceive between the standard of “voluntary consent,” and the
Court’s application of it, many scholars have called for a more robust
definition of “voluntariness.” For example, numerous scholars have
called for a requirement that police notify suspects of their right to decline
a request to search13 and for recognition that coercion is inherent in any
police interaction.14
In addition to the scholars seeking to change the doctrine of consent to
require true consent, a growing body of scholarship instead attempts to
explain the dichotomy between the language of consent and the actual
doctrine of consent by exploring the distinction between subjective and
objective notions of consent. The language of “voluntary consent”
implies a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of the person granting
consent. 15 Although some of the Court’s early decisions on consent
9. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (“[T]he fiction of consent in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has led to suspicionless searches of many thousands of innocent citizens who
‘consent’ to searches under coercive circumstances.”); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court,
Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 141 (“The Drayton world
is fiction.”); Strauss, supra note 1, at 252 (“[T]he determination of voluntariness is currently
confused, misapplied, and based on a fiction.”).
10. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 786 (noting that critics of the consent-search
doctrine have relied on empirical psychological studies to demonstrate “the harmful fiction of
‘voluntariness’”).
11. See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 175, 175, 193 (1991) (“Both law and psychology point to the same conclusion—consent
in reality is consentless.” (emphasis added)).
12. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1662 (noting that “yes, the continued
use of scare quotes [for the word “consent”] is entirely deliberate”); Simmons, supra note 3, at
783–85 (repeatedly placing the word voluntary in quotation marks); Lichtenberg, supra note 5
(placing the word “voluntary” in quotation marks in the article’s title).
13. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the
Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 465–66 (2004)
(recommending warnings, similar to the warnings rejected in Schneckloth, that would require
police to warn people they have a right to refuse consent); Gallini, supra note 2, at 235–36; Craig
Hemmens & Jeffrey R. Maahs, Reason to Believe: When Does Detention End and a Consensual
Encounter Begin? An Analysis of Ohio v. Robinette, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 309, 346 (1996)
(arguing that officers should be required to advise citizens of their right to not cooperate); Christo
Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2007)
(encouraging states to use their own constitutions to implement several consent-search reforms,
including warnings about the right to refuse consent); cf. Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity”
in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 410 (1997)
(suggesting a rule requiring police officers to return “a motorist’s driving documents before or
simultaneous with the statement ‘you are free to go’”).
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 177 (“In the context of the consent search, the
subjective view seems required because the sole validating source of police authority to intrude on
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searches do indicate the use of a subjective standard, the Court has
repeatedly injected an objective standard of reasonableness into its
analysis of consent.16 The Court’s focus in determining voluntariness is
not on whether the defendant actually exercised free will in granting
consent, but instead on whether police used unacceptable tactics to gain
consent. 17 Scholars have analyzed the Court’s consent jurisprudence
through a “new paradigm” of reasonableness, characterizing the case law
as focusing not on true voluntariness, but on the reasonableness of police
conduct. 18 This emphasis on reasonableness is said to be appropriate
because, after all, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”19
Though the renewed scholarly focus on the role of reasonableness in
the Court’s consent jurisprudence is helpful in explaining the puzzling
disconnect between language and doctrine, much of the current emphasis
on reasonableness is still articulated through the coercion/voluntariness
dichotomy: Did police use (unreasonably) coercive tactics that would
override a (reasonable) person’s free will? This focus on the coerciveness
of the police conduct, and its subsequent impact upon volition, is not the
same standard of reasonableness that is the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, it is borrowed from the Court’s Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence governing the voluntariness of statements to police.20
That the Court has built confession law around a compulsion/consent
dichotomy is unsurprising given the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that
no person be “compelled” to be a witness against himself. 21 But the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition is against “unreasonable” searches and
seizures, and the default measure of reasonableness is a warrant based on
probable cause.22 Usually when the Court recognizes an exception to the
default rule, it grounds that exception in a concept of reasonableness that
requires a weighing of the governmental interests served by the
a premier constitutional right is the individual’s grant of permission.”).
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. Strauss, supra note 1, at 212.
18. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 773, 822 (“The new paradigm is simple: instead of
holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply because the individual has ‘voluntarily’
waived his rights, we are applying the Fourth Amendment to the search and concluding that as
long as the police officer’s behavior is appropriate, the search is reasonable and thus
constitutional.” (emphasis added)).
19. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967)).
20. See infra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“The text of the Amendment thus
expressly imposes two requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second,
a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the
authorized search is set out with particularity.”); Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037
(2013) (“This Court has stated the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are reasonable
only if based on probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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warrantless conduct against the level of the intrusion to the affected
Fourth Amendment interests: liberty and privacy.23 Because the Court
has instead relied on the myth of voluntary consent as a proxy for the
warrant and probable cause requirements that normally define
“reasonable” in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has also
bypassed the usual substitute proxy for Fourth Amendment
reasonableness: an express weighing of the governmental and citizen
interests at stake. By focusing on reasonableness through the Fifth
Amendment lens of preventing coercion, rather than reasonableness
through the Fourth Amendment lens of protecting liberty and privacy, the
Court has lost sight of the heart of the Fourth Amendment itself.
This Article builds upon the renewed scholarly focus on the role
reasonableness plays in the Court’s consent jurisprudence by looking to
the traditional balancing of Fourth Amendment interests to shape
consent-search doctrine. Drawing on the Court’s approach to
“reasonableness” in other Fourth Amendment contexts, this Article looks
to the concept of “macro reasonableness” to argue that, as currently
defined, the consent-search doctrine strikes an improper balance between
governmental and individual interests at stake. It then seeks to reshape the
prevailing doctrine, using a requirement of “micro reasonableness,” to
strike a better balance and to make the doctrine of consent more
reasonable at a macro level.
Part I sets forth the current doctrine governing consent searches and
demonstrates that the Court has been quick to find consent whenever a
person has an alternative to complying with a law enforcement request.
Part II sets forth the most prevalent critique of the consent-search
exception to the warrant requirement—its failure to reflect the real-world
dynamics of police–citizen interactions. Turning to the role that
reasonableness plays in consent-search doctrine, Part III examines the
Court’s focus on objective factors, rather than a subjective standard of
voluntariness, in scrutinizing the “voluntariness” of consent searches.
This Article then argues that the Court has focused on reasonableness
only at the micro level, and only in terms of coercion, examining on a
case-by-case basis the coerciveness of police tactics.
Part IV proposes an alternative standard of macro reasonableness for
consensual searches that requires balancing the interests of law
enforcement against the costs to individual liberty and privacy. This
Article then demonstrates that, to the extent the Court has undertaken a
“macro” examination of reasonableness at all, it has overstated the extent
that consent searches advance governmental interests and understated
their toll on individual privacy. Finally, Part V concludes with a
23. See infra notes 218–27 and accompanying text; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
703 (1983) (“The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person
recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine
the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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proscriptive recommendation of how consent doctrine might be altered to
make it more reflective of the Fourth Amendment’s “touchstone” of
reasonableness. When scrutinizing whether a search falls within the
consent-search exception to the warrant requirement, courts should look
not only at the voluntariness of the person’s consent, but also at the
reasonableness of the government’s request for consent. By employing a
“micro” requirement of reasonableness that focuses on traditional Fourth
Amendment factors rather than Fifth Amendment notions of coercion,
the consent-search doctrine would comport with Fourth Amendment
notions of reasonableness at a “macro” level. This approach would also
drastically change the manner in which law enforcement is trained to
conduct consent searches. Rather than treating them as “free” searches
outside of the usual Fourth Amendment framework, law enforcement
would need to be mindful of the reasonableness of consent searches at all
stages, not only in obtaining consent, but also in the initial request and the
subsequent execution.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSENT
The Fourth Amendment familiarly provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.24
The Amendment’s “reasonableness clause” protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, while the Supreme Court has read
the Amendment’s “warrant clause” to create a default presumption that,
to be reasonable, searches and seizures must be conducted pursuant to a
warrant based on probable cause.25
Despite the Supreme Court’s formal reliance on the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant clause to define reasonableness, searches
conducted with warrants are, empirically, the exception in criminal
investigations.26 The divergence between the formal default presumption
and the reality on the streets can be attributed primarily to two attributes
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court has defined the
terms “search” and “seizure” in ways that remove many investigative
tactics from the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Second, even if police
activity rises to the level of a “search” or a “seizure,” as the Court has
defined those terms, the Court has recognized numerous exceptions to the
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent.”).
26. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 139–40
(2008) (discussing the empirical gap between searches conducted with and without warrants).
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warrant requirement, allowing law enforcement to rely on alternative
measures of a search or seizure’s reasonableness.
The distinction between these two doctrinal “moves” is critical. The
use of the first move is determinative as a threshold matter. By its very
language, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches
and seizures.27 If police action constitutes neither a search nor a seizure,
the Fourth Amendment provides no role for the judiciary to scrutinize its
reasonableness, whether defined through the warrant clause or not.28 The
non-search/non-seizure could be as unreasonable as imaginable (e.g.,
inspecting the curbside garbage29 of only those homes painted in primary
colors), and yet the Fourth Amendment would have nothing to say about
it.30 In contrast, when the Court uses the second “move,” the challenged
police action is still subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Accordingly,
even if the Court is persuaded to set aside the presumptive warrant
requirement, the government conduct still must be reasonable.31
As demonstrated in this Part, the Court has permitted consent searches
not by removing them from the scope of the Fourth Amendment
altogether, but by recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement.
Accordingly, the resulting searches must be reasonable. Moreover, in
applying the consent exception, the Court has been quick to find
voluntary consent as long as the consenting party had the option of
refusing.
A. Consent Searches Are “Searches”
Under Katz v. United States,32 police activity constitutes a search only
if it implicates reasonable expectations of privacy.33 This is a two-prong
test, requiring first that the person manifest a subjective expectation of
privacy, and second, that the expectation of privacy “be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”34 In applying the Katz standard,
the Court has held that when people make otherwise private information
available publicly, governmental inspection of that information does not
implicate reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore does not
27. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion)
(“Numerous other courts have agreed that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.”).
29. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless searches of garbage voluntarily
left out for collection. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). For a general
discussion of what constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, see Section I.A.
30. As one early commentator noted: “[W]here the [F]ourth [A]mendment is inapplicable,
the law does not give a constitutional damn about noncompliance.” Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The
Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold
of “So What?,” 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 76.
31. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558–59.
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 361.
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constitute a search.35 For example, neither surveillance from a public
vantage point 36 nor inspection of a person’s garbage is considered a
“search,”37 and therefore police may engage in these activities without
even justifying them as reasonable. This is true even when the public
vantage point is from a low-level helicopter hovering over otherwise
protected curtilage 38 or when flashlights, 39 binoculars, 40 or electronic
beepers41 facilitate the viewing of publicly exposed information.
One possible conception of a consent search is that it does not
constitute a “search” at all because the person has voluntarily chosen to
allow the police to search and therefore no longer expects privacy in the
area searched.42 Indeed, this is the doctrinal approach the Court has used
to validate the lawfulness of consensual encounters with police,
removing them entirely from the definition of a “seizure.”43 The seeds for
the idea that not all police–citizen encounters rise to the level of a Fourth
Amendment “seizure” were first planted in United States v.
Mendenhall.44 In Mendenhall, two plainclothes agents approached the
defendant as she was walking through an airport concourse, identified
themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her airline ticket and
35. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
48–56 (9th ed. 2010) (noting that cases after Katz make clear that “if an aspect of a person’s life is
subject to scrutiny by other members of society, then that person has no legitimate expectation in
denying equivalent access to police,” and providing several examples).
36. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)).
37. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
38. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
39. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (“It is likewise beyond dispute that
Maples’ action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown’s car trenched upon no
right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendment.”).
40. E.g., United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). To be sure, the use of technology that
reveals more than has been exposed to public view can constitute a search. E.g., Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that police conducted a “search” by using heat-detection
devices to monitor heat radiation from a home, in part, because it revealed details about activity in
the home that would otherwise have been unknown without physical intrusion).
42. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates
the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1991) (providing that consent
searches are easily conceptualized as non-searches under Katz—thereby rendering the Fourth
Amendment “inapplicable”—because “consent amounts to a citizen’s surrender of an expectation
of privacy and an exposure of an otherwise private interest”).
43. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 434 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 558 (1980).
44. See 446 U.S. at 554–55 (providing that absent some indicia of seizure, such as the
threatening presence of officers or the display of a weapon, “inoffensive contact between a
member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that
person”). A plurality of the Supreme Court first applied the free-to-leave test in Royer, but cited
Justice Stewart’s analysis in Mendenhall as support. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 (citing Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 555).
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identification.45 At the agent’s request, she eventually followed them to
the airport Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office, where she
ultimately consented to a search of both her person and purse.46 Justice
Powell, concurring, reasoned that any seizure of the defendant was
supported by the requisite level of suspicion.47 Justice Stewart, however,
writing for himself and Justice Rehnquist, reasoned that the defendant
was never seized at all; therefore, the government did not need to justify
the encounter.48
To remove some police–citizen encounters from judicial scrutiny,
Justice Stewart compiled language from the Court’s seizure
jurisprudence that appeared to distinguish between seizures that
implicated Fourth Amendment interests and mere encounters that did
not.49 In Terry v. Ohio,50 for example, the Court observed that “not all
personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’
of persons.”51 Concurring in Terry, both Justice White and Justice Harlan
noted that a police officer, like any other person, has the right to pose
questions to people on the street. 52 In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart
reasoned that a person has not been seized unless her freedom of
movement has been restrained, either through physical force or a show of
authority. 53 This conception of a voluntary citizen–police encounter
conjures images of cordial police officers, walking the beat, talking to
cooperative citizens about the neighborhood, the weather, and baseball:
“As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon
that person’s liberty or privacy . . . .”54
In Florida v. Royer, 55 a plurality of the Court built upon Justice
Stewart’s earlier conception of a consensual police encounter and held
that an encounter rises to the level of a “seizure” only if, under the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person

45. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547–48.
46. Id. at 548.
47. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring). The government needs “reasonable suspicion” to
support a brief, investigatory seizure of a person that falls short of an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Where such a stop is reasonable,
however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is . . . an
articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.” (emphasis added)).
48. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
49. Id. at 552–55.
50. 392 U.S. 1.
51. Id. at 19 n.16.
52. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a
policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.”); id. at 32–33 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (observing that police officers enjoy “the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to
address questions to other persons”).
53. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
54. Id. at 554.
55. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
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would not have felt free to leave.56 As long as a reasonable person feels
free to leave, the Court treats the police activity as a mere encounter,
beneath the Fourth Amendment threshold. Importantly, by removing
these encounters from the definition of a “seizure,” the Court has left no
role for the judiciary under the Fourth Amendment to scrutinize the
reasonableness of the encounter at all, let alone require a warrant.
One could imagine the Court taking a similar approach to consent
searches. Government conduct constitutes a search only if it implicates
reasonable expectations of privacy, and one could argue that a person
loses any reasonable expectation of privacy by agreeing to a search.
Instead, the Court has used a different doctrinal basis for conceptualizing
consent in the search context, treating consent searches as “searches”
under the Fourth Amendment, but recognizing consent as an exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements. The seminal case reflecting
this approach is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.57 In Schneckloth, an officer
stopped a vehicle because a headlight and license plate light were burned
out.58 The driver and four of his five passengers, including the defendant,
could not produce a license. 59 The one passenger that produced
identification, said the car was his brother’s, and gave consent to a search
of the car—answering, “Sure, go ahead”—which yielded evidence
incriminating the defendant.60
The Court began with a general pronouncement that all searches
conducted without a warrant based on probable cause were presumed to
be unreasonable, but then noted “that one of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a
search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”61 In exploring the proper
test for determining the voluntariness of consent, the Court expressly
distinguished between the notion of voluntary consent necessary to
validate a warrantless search and the notion of a knowing, voluntary, and
intentional relinquishment of rights necessary to waive other rights
associated with a fair trial, such as the right to a lawyer or to a jury under
the Sixth Amendment.62 The Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned, did
not go directly to the reliability or integrity of the fact-finding mission of
a trial.63 Moreover, the Court believed it would be unfeasible to expect
police on the street to adhere to the same standards of waiver that can be
met in the formal setting of a courtroom.64 Instead, the Court held that the
voluntariness of consent must be determined in light of the totality of the
56. Id. at 502 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
57. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
58. Id. at 220.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 219.
62. See id. at 242–43.
63. Id. at 242 (“The protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . have nothing whatever to do
with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial.”).
64. Id. at 231–32, 243.
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circumstances. 65 Importantly, the citizen’s knowledge of his right to
refuse to grant consent—imperative to any showing of a true
“waiver”—was only one fact to be considered.66 Accordingly, a court
could deem consent to be voluntary even when the police did not advise
the citizen that he was free to decline.67
The general role that the concept of consent plays in Fourth
Amendment doctrine—whether by removing consensual encounters
from the scope of the amendment altogether or by treating consensual
searches as reasonable—appears at first glance to be eminently
uncontroversial. If a person chooses to engage in an encounter with
police, or to share with law enforcement information that would
otherwise be private, why should courts interfere with that decision and
prohibit the government’s activity after the fact? In both the search and
seizure context, the Court has relied on the intuitive appeal of the
common-sense notion that people are free to cooperate with law
enforcement if they choose to do so. 68 Accordingly, if a person
voluntarily opts not to exercise the full scope of her liberty or privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment, then the police are entitled to rely on
the volunteered cooperation without judicial interference.69
However, the Court’s application of this common-sense premise
reveals two hidden, less innocuous assumptions about human choice:
first, that a person’s agreement in the face of alternative options means
that the person has voluntarily consented; and second, that people who
consent in the absence of police compulsion do so because they want to
cooperate with police. The next Section explores those hidden
assumptions about human choice.
B. Consent in Action: Options and Preference
Despite the intuitive appeal of the notion that a person’s consent to
police conduct should be dispositive of the conduct’s legality, scholars
are nearly universal in their criticism of the Court’s treatment of consent
in both the liberty and privacy contexts. Multiple scholars have noted a
65. Id. at 227.
66. Id. at 249.
67. See id. at 231–33; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203, 206 (2002);
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996).
68. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197, 205 (“The Fourth Amendment permits police
officers to approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to
searches, provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse.”
(emphasis added)); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (distinguishing unreasonable
searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and “voluntary cooperation”
permitted by the Fourth Amendment); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 (providing that the Fourth
Amendment is not designed to discourage the community from “aiding” in the apprehension of
criminals because the community has a “real interest in encouraging consent”).
69. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207 (“Police officers act in full accord with the law when they
ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her
wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place,
it dispels inferences of coercion.”).
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schism between the language of the governing standards, which
emphasizes freedom of voluntary choice, and actual case outcomes,
where the Court repeatedly finds voluntary consent when reality would
suggest otherwise. 70 Though the premise of the free-to-leave and
consent-search doctrines is that police, like any other people, are free to
approach people on the street, 71 encounters and consent searches that
eventually yield incriminatory evidence tend to go beyond a discussion of
weather, sports, or any other innocuous conversation that any two
ordinary citizens might have on the street. Indeed, the seminal cases
themselves involve facts that show the pressures attendant in
police–citizen interactions, even in the absence of direct threats or
commands.
In Mendenhall, for example, after the agents initially approached the
defendant in the airport and asked for her ticket and identification, the
defendant produced a ticket and identification in two different names.72
The agents then questioned the defendant about the discrepancy and
about the length of her trip.73 One of the agents specifically identified
himself as a federal drug agent.74 According to the government’s own
testimony, the defendant’s demeanor changed notably in response to this
information: she “became quite shaken” and “extremely nervous” and
“had a hard time speaking.”75 When the agents returned her ticket and
identification to her and asked her to accompany them to the airport DEA
office for further questioning, she followed them, but with no verbal
response noted in the record. 76 Though she initially gave the agents
permission to search her person and purse, it was not until a female police
officer arrived that she learned for the first time that a search of her person
would require her to remove her clothing. 77 The defendant did not
immediately agree. Instead, she said she needed to catch her flight.78 In
response, the officer said there would be no problem if the defendant
were not carrying drugs.79 The defendant yielded, once again without
70. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 773–74 (arguing that the Court’s consent-search
paradigm “fails to acknowledge the complexities of police-civilian interaction and runs against
the traditional standards of the Fourth Amendment” and noting that Drayton is an example in
which, like past Supreme Court decisions, “the ruling that the defendants truly consent[] to the
search had . . . an ‘air of unreality’ about it”); see also supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
71. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[L]aw
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual
on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.” (citations omitted)).
72. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1980).
73. Id. at 548.
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 548–49.
78. Id. at 549.
79. Id.
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verbal comment, and disrobed for the search, revealing narcotics hidden
beneath her clothes.80
The defendant later argued that her statement to the police officer that
she needed to catch her flight demonstrated resistance to the search.81
Justice Stewart rejected this argument, reasoning that the statement
simply evinced a concern about how long the search would take―as if
anyone concerned with the timing of a flight would ever volunteer for a
detour to and search within a DEA office.82 Despite the nature of the
conversation (we are agents looking for drugs), the setting (come with us
even though you are trying to catch a flight), the individuals involved
(two agents and a police officer versus one demonstrably nervous,
twenty-two-year-old high-school dropout), and the intrusiveness of the
ultimate outcome (a strip search), Justices Stewart and Rehnquist would
have held that no seizure occurred,83 and a majority of the Court upheld
the search as consensual.84
As Professor Kent Greenfield has noted, the Court has been quick to
find valid consent based simply upon the existence of an alternative
choice, without exploring the desirability or feasibility of that option.85
For example, in INS v. Delgado,86 the Court reviewed the legality of
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) factory sweeps, in which
INS agents inspected workplaces to determine if employers were using
unauthorized workers.87 The agents were armed, wearing badges, and
carrying walkie-talkies.88 Some of the agents stood at the factory exits
while others moved through the workplace to question workers about
their citizenship status.89 The Court recognized that workers might feel
restricted in their movement under these conditions, but reasoned that the
limitation came from the realities of being at work, not because the agents
were keeping them there.90 Because the workers still had the option of
moving about the factory freely, they had not been seized, and therefore
the sweeps did not need to be justified as reasonable.91
Perhaps most illustrative of the Court’s penchant for equating the
existence of options to voluntary consent is its approval of so-called bus
sweeps in Florida v. Bostick92 and United States v. Drayton.93 In both
80. Id.
81. Id. at 559.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 555 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
84. Id. at 558 (majority opinion).
85. Greenfield, supra note 7, at 11–12 (exploring what he calls an “ultra-dispositionalist
paradigm” to defining choice, in which the existence of other choices is dispositive).
86. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
87. Id. at 212.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 218.
91. Id. at 218–19.
92. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
93. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
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cases, armed agents participating in drug interdiction programs boarded
buses during stopovers and asked passengers for consent to search their
luggage for contraband.94 In Bostick, the Court held that there was no per
se prohibition against the sweeps, even though no passenger would
literally feel “free to leave” a bus on which they had booked a ride.95
Likening the facts to Delgado, the Court in Bostick reasoned that the
passengers’ movements were confined not by government conduct, but
by the realities of their own conditions.96 The relevant inquiry, the Court
held, was “whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”97 Although the
Court declined to answer this critical question in Bostick,98 it went further
in Drayton, finding that a reasonable bus passenger would have felt free
to disengage from a bus sweep, even though officers were posted at the
bus entrance and passengers were not told they had a right not to
participate in the requested searches. 99 To the majority, Drayton’s
engagement with the officer was consensual, and therefore not a seizure,
because he had options: he could have gotten off the bus or declined the
search and remained seated among his fellow consenting passengers
(after having been the one bad egg who refused to cooperate with law
enforcement).100
The Court’s consent jurisprudence exposes a worldview that assumes
not only that reasonable people can exercise their options vis-à-vis law
enforcement, but also that when they do, the option they exercise is
preferred. From this view, a person who chooses to be searched when she
could say no, or who chooses to stay when she could in fact go, is not only
uncoerced, she is content because she wants to cooperate. For example,
the defendant in Drayton pointed to the fact that nearly all passengers
consented to a search in the bus sweeps as evidence that people believed
that they had no choice but to comply. 101 The majority rejected this
reasoning and instead viewed the high levels of cooperation as evidence
that people know their rights, are able to exercise them, and yet
choose—not only without coercion, but happily and for their own
benefit—to consent: The “bus passengers answer officers’ questions and
otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers
know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of
those around them.”102

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431–32; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435–36, 440.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id. at 437 (refraining from “deciding whether or not a seizure occurred in this case”).
536 U.S. at 197–98, 203–04.
See id. at 203–04.
See id. at 205.
Id.
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Similarly, in Sibron v. New York,103 decided the same day as Terry v.
Ohio,104 a police officer approached the defendant in a restaurant and told
him to accompany the officer outside. 105 Although the Court did not
determine whether Sibron had been seized, it noted that the record was
“barren of any indication whether Sibron accompanied [the officer]
outside in submission to a show of force or authority which left him no
choice, or whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation
with the officer’s investigation.”106 The Court appears to treat coercion
and content cooperation as the only possible explanations. As Professor
Ric Simmons has cogently argued, the Court has created a fiction that
treats coercion and voluntary consent as either/or conditions in a false
binary: consent that is not coerced by improper state conduct is treated as
if it is happily and freely given.107 The Court assumes that the reason
people consent to police activity, when they have the option of declining,
is out of desire to help the police serve the public.108
II. THE ABSENCE OF TRUE CONSENT
Nearly unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the Court’s application
of both the free-to-leave and consent doctrines, scholars have called on
the judiciary to apply the tests with a realistic understanding of the
reasons people comply with requests from law enforcement.109 These
scholars reject the false binaries of either explicit police coercion, on one
103. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
104. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
105. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45.
106. Id. at 63.
107. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 785 (noting the falseness of the Court’s treatment of
coercion and voluntariness as a binary, in which “a consent to search is ‘voluntary’ if the police
have not used ‘coercive’ tactics in obtaining the consent”).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (stating that citizen
consent to searches reinforces a society based on law); Andrew E. Taslitz, Bullshitting the People:
The Criminal Procedure Implications of a Scatalogical Term, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383,
1422–24 (2007) (setting forth studies and research supporting the proposition that people may
obey the police, despite the option not to comply, because of a “moral obligation” to do the right
thing and to “empower government to solve problems”).
109. See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 9, 155–57 (criticizing the Court’s consent-search analysis
as understating the “extent to which citizens in police encounters feel free to refuse” and
recommending that the consent-search paradigm should incorporate empirical findings “on
compliance and social influence into Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence”); Rotenberg,
supra note 11, at 185–86 (“If consent is determined from the police perspective, and the
consenter’s subjective limits to the search, as artificial and fictional as they are, do not serve to
restrain the police, then the consent search becomes virtually limitless.”); cf. Chanenson, supra
note 13, at 459–61 (arguing that while the emerging empirical evidence “highlights disturbing
concerns about the role of citizens’ fear of police reprisal in the consent search process,” courts
are seemingly less apt than the police departments themselves to consider this empirical evidence
in resolving legal issues surrounding consent searches); Tracy Maclin, The Good and Bad News
About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 78–81 (2008)
(suggesting that if a person refuses to give consent, then police should be barred from further
seeking consent in order to “protect the Fourth Amendment rights of persons who are
uncomfortable dealing with police-citizen encounters”).
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hand, or “in a spirit of apparent cooperation,”110 and for “their own safety
and the safety of those around them,”111 on the other. Most commonly,
critics have pointed to two other explanations for so-called cooperation
with law enforcement: lack of knowledge about options and lack of
fortitude to exercise them.
A. Lack of Knowledge
First, despite the Court’s assumption that a request necessarily
conveys the listener’s power to decline, people may be unaware of their
options not to cooperate with a police request.112 They may see the right
to decline as one that comes with legal or practical costs. As a legal
matter, they may believe that a failure to cooperate will be viewed as
suspicious and lead not only to the inevitable search but perhaps even
more coercive action by the police. 113 These fears are not unfounded
given the broad discretion police have to enforce the most minor
transgressions through custodial arrest.114
In Ohio v. Robinette,115 the Court appeared to reason that a driver
would feel free to disengage from law enforcement, even when the initial
limitation on his freedom of movement resulted from a police seizure.116
The defendant was initially stopped for speeding.117 The officer asked for
and received the defendant’s driver’s license, ran the defendant’s driving
history, and then asked the defendant to step out of the car.118 After giving
the defendant a verbal warning for speeding and returning his license to
him, the officer said, “One question before you get gone: [A]re you
carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind,
drugs, anything like that?”119 The defendant responded, “no,” and then
110. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63.
111. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205.
112. See Chanenson, supra note 13, at 454 (discussing empirical research showing that most
people do not know of their right to refuse to consent).
113. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON
THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 81 (1988) (“Refusal of requested ‘permission’ is
thought by most of us to risk unpleasant, though unknown, consequences.”); Burkoff, supra note
7, at 1118 (noting that people fear that a refusal to cooperate will make them look guilty);
Chanenson, supra note 13, at 454.
114. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173–76 (2008) (holding that a custodial arrest for
a misdemeanor is constitutionally valid even if the state legislature has determined that
punishment for the crime does not include arrest); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
323–24, 354–55 (2001) (holding that if a police officer “has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense,” such as a seatbelt offense, then the
police officer “may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender” (emphasis
added)); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996) (upholding police seizure of a
driver who had committed a minor traffic offense and holding that the officer’s subjective
intentions for the seizure were immaterial).
115. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
116. See id. at 38–40.
117. Id. at 35.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 35–36 (alteration in original).
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consented to a search of his car, which yielded controlled substances.120
The Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in favor of the
defendant, because the state court had incorrectly used a bright-line rule
requiring police to tell a previously seized suspect that he was free to
leave prior to engaging in consensual interrogation. 121 Although the
Court’s opinion was narrow, it reveals an underlying assumption that
there exists any set of circumstances in which a driver already stopped by
police on the side of the road would choose to leave before being told
expressly that he has a right to do so. The Court did not even entertain the
possibility that the defendant may have believed that he would have been
detained longer if he refused to consent to the search.
Even if people do not fear legal repercussions for refusing to consent,
they may believe as a practical matter that the searches are a prerequisite
to maintaining their status quo, and may not want to be treated differently
as a result of their non-compliance with police. 122 For example,
passengers on a bus may believe that bus-sweep searches 123 are a
prerequisite to remaining on the bus and may not want to exit a bus in the
middle of the night, in the middle of nowhere.124 Employees at a factory
may view compliance with the INS125 as a precondition to employment
and may not want to be disciplined or fired for failing to comply with a
request for information. Members of communities with historically tense
relationships with police may fear that a refusal to cooperate will
“aggravate or intensify” the encounter.126
People lack knowledge about the repercussions not only of refusing to
consent, but also of granting their consent. They may believe that
cooperation will be viewed as evidence of innocence, and therefore the
police officer might not search at all or will conduct a more cursory
inspection than if the person did not cooperate.127 They may not know
that they can limit the scope of the search or revoke consent at any
time.128 And they may not know that, even if they grant consent, police
120. Id. at 36.
121. Id. at 39–40.
122. See Greenfield, supra note 7, at 11–12 (noting the Supreme Court’s failure to take into
account the costs of exercising options other than cooperation).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
124. Greenfield, supra note 7, at 11–12.
125. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
126. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
1013–14 (2002) (noting that when people of color decline a request to search, the refusal “can
racially aggravate or intensify the encounter, increasing the person of color’s vulnerability to
physical violence, arrest, or both”).
127. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding
Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1523–24 (2011) (“Perhaps the most pervasive example of an activity
that law-abiding persons take to avoid a search is, ironically, consenting to a search.”); Burkoff,
supra note 7, at 1118.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Clearly a person
may limit or withdraw his consent to a search, and the police must honor such limitations.”).
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may still subject them to whatever repercussions they feared as a
consequence of refusal.
B. Lack of Fortitude
In construing citizens’ apparent cooperation with law enforcement,
the Court’s jurisprudence also fails to consider the natural tendency of
people to comply with authority. Evidence from social psychology
suggests that typical people, even if they realize they have the option not
to cooperate with law enforcement, may lack the fortitude to do so.129 It
has been decades since psychologist Stanley Milgram’s influential
obedience studies demonstrated the power of perceived authority.130 In
those experiments, subjects were told they would be assisting researchers
who were studying the educational effects of negative reinforcement.131
Subjects were led to believe that they were in the role of “teacher,”
matched with a “learner,” who was actually a confederate of the
researchers.132 As learners attempted to complete a task involving the
pairing of random word pairs, teachers were supposed to reinforce
mistakes with escalating levels of shock, using what appeared to be a
shock-inducing machine, complete with voltage labels and descriptions
ranging from “slight shock” to “moderate shock” to “Danger: severe
shock,” and most daunting of all, “XXX.”133 As the level of (fake) shock
escalated, so too did the learner’s protests of discomfort and ultimately
severe pain, followed by foreboding silence.134 Despite this “evidence” of
the learner’s misery, remarkably few subjects were willing to disobey the
experimenters.135 In fact, most continued to deliver shocks up to the most
severe level, even after their learners had fallen into silence.136
Numerous scholars have drawn on the Milgram studies to argue that
the Supreme Court has overestimated the fortitude of most people to
refuse to cooperate with police. 137 Granted, Milgram’s experimental
129. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 820 (arguing that the social power exhibited by law
enforcement may explain why persons give consent despite knowing of their right to refuse);
Lichtenberg, supra note 5, at 363–65 (noting that people are likely to respond to the authority
inherent to a police officer, even when they understand they have a legal right to refuse consent).
130. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 19–20.
134. Id. at 22 (“To our consternation, even the strongest protests from the victim did not
prevent many subjects from administering the harshest punishment ordered by the
experimenter.”); see also id. at 32–33 (discussing results of the shock experiment in which
twenty-six of forty subjects continued to shock the victim despite protests and ceasing therefrom).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 35.
137. See, e.g., Lichtenberg, supra note 5, at 363–65 (citing Milgram to develop a distinction
between the “social power” and “legitimate power” underlying authority); Nadler, supra note 9, at
176–77 (noting some “obvious differences” between consent searches and Milgram’s paradigm,
but concluding “that in both situations, people are coerced to comply when they would prefer to
refuse”); Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 187–89 (relying on Milgram’s research to argue that people

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/2

20

Burke: Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness

2015]

CONSENT SEARCHES AND FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS

529

paradigm is not a perfect analog to a police officer’s request for consent
to search.138 As Professor Simmons has argued, in Milgram’s studies, the
researchers used firm commands, and many of the subjects protested
vigorously, even as they complied.139 The difference between a command
followed by reluctant compliance, and a request followed by apparent
cooperation, is important in the Fourth Amendment context. The Court
has been quick to find voluntary consent as long as police phrase the
request for consent to search as a question, and not a command.140
However, language does not exist in a vacuum; listeners interpret
words in their social context.141 Accordingly, a police officer’s request
for cooperation, “however gently phrased, is likely to be taken by even
the toughest citizen as a command.”142 Moreover, this interpretation will
not always be incorrect in a world in which commands are often couched
in the language of request. For example, police officers are authorized to
order a vehicle’s occupants out of the car during a lawful traffic stop.143
Nevertheless, one could imagine an officer exercising this authority by
asking, “Do you mind stepping out of the car for me?” rather than stating,
“I have the authority to order you out of the car, whether you like it or
not.” That the statement ends with a question mark is not inconsistent
with the fact that the cars’ occupants do not have a choice but to comply.

consent to search because of the implicit authority of police); Strauss, supra note 1, at 236–41
(using Milgram’s research to argue that people are likely to comply with a “request” by
authorities); Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 243 (1997) (citing Milgram’s research and other social psychology to argue that
“innocent suspects, much like guilty suspects, are likely to be unable to meaningfully exercise
their Fourth Amendment right to exclude the police”).
138. Nadler, supra note 9, at 176 (noting the “obvious differences” as well as the similarities
between the situation “in which Milgram’s subjects found themselves” and the typical
consent-search scenario).
139. Simmons, supra note 3, at 805–07 (maintaining that applying the Milgram experiments
to consent searches is “problematic at best”).
140. See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1823 & n.66
(1998).
141. See Nadler, supra note 9, at 168–72, 179–97 (“The context of discourse is crucial in the
understanding of it; this is especially true when the speaker is making a request.” (footnote
omitted)).
142. UVILLER, supra note 113, at 81; see also Williams, supra note 8, at 89 (“After all, what
maddens us about the voluntariness locution in consent-search cases is precisely the unreality of
it—most everyone would feel coerced by the sorts of police encounters that are described
everyday in our courthouses.”); Janice Nadler & J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police
Encounters, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 326, 333–36 (Peter M. Tiersma &
Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012) (maintaining that courts fail to consider context when examining
the language of police encounters).
143. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 & n.6 (1977) (per curiam) (declaring a
bright-line rule that ordering the driver out of the car during a traffic stop is reasonable and
describing the intrusion as “de minimis”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997)
(extending Mimms to passengers).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

530

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Professor Janice Nadler’s insightful work on the language of police
encounters is especially relevant here. 144 As she has pointed out,
empirical evidence demonstrates that the relative hierarchy between
speaker and listener affects the meaning of language.145 For example, in
one study, researchers asked subjects to assume the role of an employee
being told, either by a boss or a co-worker, not to be late to work again.146
When subjects listened to a peer, they heard a directive (“don’t be late
again”) as more coercive than a suggestion (“try not to be late again”).147
When a boss was speaking, however, the forcefulness of the language
was irrelevant. The researchers concluded that “[t]hose who have
authority apparently need not activate coercive potential through their
discourse. Their roles are sufficient to do so.”148
Because police are in a position of authority, regardless of the
language they use, listeners are unlikely to distinguish between a
command to search and a request.149 Just as any driver would understand
from the question, “Can I please see your license and registration?,” that
she is required to produce the requested items, 150 most people will
understand an officer’s request to search as a direction to comply. The
failure of courts to consider the social context of the words police use to
obtain consent to search is but one example of what Professors Peter
Tiersma and Lawrence Solan call “selective literalism”—the tendency of
courts to construe words literally when beneficial to law enforcement, but
to interpret language within its social context when a literal construction
might benefit the defendant:
[T]he problem is not merely that judges sometimes interpret
the utterances of ordinary people in an overly literal way by
failing to take pragmatic information into account. Rather,
judges are selective in when they take pragmatic factors into
consideration. Whether consciously or not, their interpretive
practices tend either to ignore or to take into account
pragmatic information when it benefits police and
prosecutors. The utterances that police officers make in
seeking consent to a search are almost invariably deemed to
be requests, even if the officer poses what is literally an
informational question or if the circumstances are such that
144. See Nadler, supra note 9, at 187–89; Nadler & Trout, supra note 142, at 329–33.
145. Nadler, supra note 9, at 188–90.
146. Id. at 189 (citing Jennifer L. Vollbrecht et al., Coercive Potential and Face-Sensitivity:
The Effects of Authority and Directives in Social Confrontations, 8 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 235,
240 (1997)).
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Vollbrecht et al., supra note 146, at 244) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
149. See id. at 188–89 (“[B]ecause a police officer is perceived as an authority, he need not
rely on coercive statements to achieve a goal—his role is adequate, and a polite request can
increase face-sensitivity without reducing coercive power.”).
150. See Hibbel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186–88 (2004) (holding that
states can pass laws requiring suspects to reveal their identity during a Terry stop).
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the suspect is likely to interpret the utterance as an order that
should not be refused.151
III. CONSENT: REASONABLENESS, NOT WAIVER
The failure of the Court to give more weight to a person’s actual
awareness of the alternatives to compliance,152 or a person’s actual ability
to exercise those options,153 is incompatible with any requirement that the
person subjectively intend to grant consent. Seeking to explain the
disconnect between lay notions of voluntary consent and the Court’s
apparent conception of it, recent Fourth Amendment scholarship has
emphasized the role that objective standards of reasonableness play in
consent jurisprudence, despite the Court’s narrative reliance on
subjective notions of consent. 154 However, the Court’s inquiries into
reasonableness have been imprecise, perhaps in part because the role of
reasonableness is hidden. Sometimes the Court examines the
reasonableness of police officers and at other times the Court examines
the reasonableness of the citizen. Most hidden of all is the Court’s
implicit and incorrect analysis of what this Article calls “macro
reasonableness”—an assessment of whether the consent-search
exception strikes a reasonable balance between governmental needs and
individual Fourth Amendment interests.
A. Subjective Consent v. Objective Reasonableness
Though rejecting the requirement of a formal waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights, the Court in Schneckloth nevertheless stated that the
individual characteristics of the person granting consent, such as age,
intelligence, and education, were relevant in determining whether the
defendant’s consent was voluntarily granted.155 This express consideration
of a defendant’s individual traits appears to treat the voluntariness of a
citizen’s consent to police activity as a subjective inquiry. In practice,
however, the Court applies the standard objectively. Professor Marcy Strauss
151. Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective Literalism in
American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 229, 256 (2004).
152. See supra Section II.A.
153. See supra Section II.B.
154. E.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 778–79.
155. 412 U.S. 218, 226–27; Simmons, supra note 3, at 778–79 (“The Court went out of its
way in Schneckloth to say that subjective as well as objective factors were part of the totality of
the circumstances test—noting that the defendant’s level of schooling, intelligence, and presence
or absence of any warnings were relevant considerations in determining whether a statement was
voluntary.”). When the Court uses objective standards, the individual characteristics of the
defendant generally do not play a role. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667–68
(2004) (contrasting Schneckloth factors with the objective inquiry used to determine if someone is
in custody for Miranda purposes); see also Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs.
Reasonable Lay Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1495 (2010) (noting that the factual inquiry into voluntary consent
“is nominally a subjective inquiry” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
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reviewed every consent search case published in a three-year period and
reported “only a handful of cases” in which courts analyzed the suspect’s
individual, subjective characteristics.156
Whenever confronted with a conflict between subjective intention and
objective appearance, the Court has opted for an objective approach,
emphasizing that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”157 For example, in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 158 the Court
recognized that police could lawfully rely on “apparent” consent to
search. 159 In Rodriguez, a woman who claimed to be the defendant’s
live-in girlfriend granted the police entry into the defendant’s apartment;
she referred to the home as “our” apartment, had a key to the entry, and
had clothes and furniture inside.160 In reality, the woman had moved out
of the home a month earlier and, according to Rodriguez, retained the key
without permission.161 Because she lacked authority to consent and he
did not consent, he sought to suppress the resulting evidence. 162 The
Court upheld the search because the Fourth Amendment’s only guarantee
is that searches and seizures will be “reasonable,” and the police officers
who conducted the search had acted reasonably by relying on the
woman’s apparent authority to permit entry.163
The Court has also looked to objective standards of reasonableness,
rather than subjective consent, when determining the scope of a consent
search. In Florida v. Jimeno,164 the defendant consented to a search of his
car for drugs without any further discussion of the scope of the search.165
When the police officer found a folded, brown paper bag on the
floorboard of the car, he opened it, without seeking further permission,
and found drugs inside.166 Although the Florida Supreme Court held that
the consent search of a car does not extend to sealed containers within the
car absent specific consent for the containers, the Supreme Court
reversed.167 The scope of a consent search, the Court reasoned, turns not
on what the defendant actually intended to consent to, but instead on what
“it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe” about the scope of the
person’s consent.168 From this perspective, it was “objectively reasonable
for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent’s

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Strauss, supra note 1, at 222; see also Mandiberg, supra note 155, at 1495.
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Id. at 187–89.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 183–84.
500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
See id. at 249.
Id. at 249–50.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 249.
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car included consent to search containers within that car which might
bear drugs.”169
In the seizure context, the emphasis on reasonableness is even clearer.
While the Court employs the narrative device of “voluntary consent” to
determine the legality of a consent search, the doctrinal distinction
between a seizure and a mere encounter that does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment is not determined by whether the citizen voluntarily
consents to the interaction. Instead, the relevant inquiry is clearly
objective in nature, requiring the Court to determine whether a
“reasonable person” would have believed she was free to leave under the
circumstances.170
B. Officer Reasonableness and Citizen Reasonableness
Noting the divergence between the Court’s language of voluntary
consent and the empirical realities, a growing number of scholars have
characterized consent jurisprudence as a test of reasonableness. 171
Viewed from this perspective, the Court’s emphasis upon “voluntary
consent” is mere narrative, while the Court’s “real” concern is about the
reasonableness of the challenged encounter or search.
Professor Simmons has offered reasonableness as a “new” paradigm
for analyzing consent searches. 172 Professor Daniel Williams has
challenged Simmons’s characterization of reasonableness as a new
paradigm and asserted that the Court’s emphasis upon the reasonableness
of consent searches has always been apparent.173 Regardless of whether
the focus on reasonableness is new, both Professors Simmons and
Williams characterize the relevant reasonableness inquiry as an objective
169. Id. at 251.
170. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Interestingly, the prosecution appeared to assume that the relevant inquiry was
subjective, because the Court characterized the government’s argument as follows: “The entire
encounter was consensual and hence Royer was not being held against his will at all.” Id. at 501.
However, the Court rejected the prosecution’s argument using an objective test, holding that the
circumstances—retaining Royer’s ticket and license and failing to tell him he had a right to
leave—would have led a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave. Id. at 502–03.
171. Maclin, supra note 109, at 61 (noting the “modern Court’s abandonment of
Bustamonte’s ‘voluntariness’ test and its substitution of a ‘reasonableness’ test that considers
only objective facts or criteria”); Simmons, supra note 3, at 822 (offering a “new paradigm” for
the Court’s consent jurisprudence: “As long as the police officer’s behavior is appropriate, the
search is reasonable and thus constitutional”); Williams, supra note 8, at 75 (asserting that
reasonableness “has always been the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis,” including in the
consent search context); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth
Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 23 (2008).
172. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 775–76 (enumerating the contours of the “new
paradigm”).
173. Williams, supra note 8, at 93 (“The Court might dress up the analysis with evocative
metaphysical notions, but only naiveté or the desire to erect a straw-man critique prevents one
from seeing that the Court purports to do nothing more, and nothing less, than assess
reasonableness, which is exactly Professor Simmons’s purported ‘new’ paradigm.”).
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inquiry into the appropriateness of law enforcement’s conduct.174 In both
Rodriguez and Jimeno, for example, the Court emphasized the
reasonableness of the police officers’ conduct in light of the facts known
to them at the time.175
The distinction between an objective inquiry into officer
reasonableness and a true voluntariness standard is perhaps best
illustrated with a case from the Fifth Amendment context, Colorado v.
Connelly.176 In Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer and,
without prompting from the officer, confessed to a murder committed in
another state.177 At trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements
as involuntary, because he was suffering from schizophrenia and was
hearing voices in his head telling him that he either had to confess or
commit suicide.178 Though the statements certainly were not “voluntary”
from a subjective perspective,179 the Court nevertheless held that they
were voluntary from a constitutional perspective because the state had
done nothing coercive to affect the defendant’s decision to speak.180
Professors Melanie Wilson and Tracy Maclin have both explored
reasonableness as a basis for the Fourth Amendment’s consent-search
doctrine, but have compellingly demonstrated that the Court considers not
only the reasonableness of officers, but also the reasonableness of citizens.181
In the seizure context, the Court examines citizen reasonableness directly
by finding a “seizure” only where a reasonable person would have felt
174. Simmons, supra note 3, at 817 (“The standard should be an objective one, a standard
that focuses on police conduct and not the subjective consent given by the suspect.”); Williams,
supra note 8, at 86, 89, 92–93 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that “the
power to withhold consent is governed by objective considerations, particularly the observable
conduct of the law enforcement agents” and further providing that the Court’s doctrinal path with
respect to consent searches has been charted from the “objective ‘reasonableness’ standpoint”).
175. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (“As with other factual
determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?”
(alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991). For a discussion of the role of reasonableness in both Rodriguez and Jimeno, see supra
notes 157–69 and accompanying text.
176. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
177. Id. at 160.
178. See id. at 161.
179. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (holding that statements extracted
under the threat of violence were not voluntary).
180. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164–65.
181. See Wilson, supra note 171 (discussing the role that “citizen reasonableness” plays in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Maclin, supra note 109, at 65–67 (using the majority opinion
in Drayton to demonstrate the modern Court’s tendency to treat citizens as having a
“responsibility to know and assert their rights and tell the police to leave them alone”). See
generally Mandiberg, supra note 155, at 1483 (exploring officer reasonableness and “lay person”
reasonableness in the Miranda and several Fourth Amendment contexts, and demonstrating that
the Court permits reasonable officers more room for error in their “perceptions, knowledge,
emotions, or behavior”).
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like he was not free to leave.182 Though the test in the search context
sounds more subjective (voluntary consent), the Court has sometimes
blurred the seemingly subjective consent-search doctrine with the
objective free-to-leave doctrine, stating that both encounters and searches
are consensual as long as “a reasonable person would understand that he
or she could refuse to cooperate.”183
In both contexts, the Court’s examination of reasonableness reveals a
distinctive worldview about police–citizen dynamics. When it comes to
officer reasonableness, the Court assumes that there is nothing inherently
objectionable about a police officer requesting cooperation from
citizens,184 and therefore no explanation need be given for the request.
Instead, the Court assumes that an officer’s request (as opposed to a
command) necessarily conveys a citizen’s right to refuse to cooperate.185
When it comes to citizen reasonableness, the Court assumes that
reasonable people are able to recognize the right to refuse and to exercise
it affirmatively.186
In practice, inquiries into officer reasonableness and citizen
reasonableness will blur.187 A court examining the appropriateness of law
enforcement conduct might assess its coercive impact upon the
reasonable citizen, while a court examining the effect of police conduct
on the reasonable citizen is likely to take into account the reasonableness
of the police conduct. 188 Consider the combination of California v.
Hodari D.189 and Illinois v. Wardlow190 from this perspective. In Hodari
D., the defendant ran from police and then “tossed away” a rock of
cocaine during the ensuing foot chase.191 To determine whether the police
had the requisite level of suspicion to seize Hodari D., the Court first had
to determine when the seizure occurred. 192 Adding a gloss to the
traditional free-to-leave test, the Court held that to be seized, the
defendant had to either submit to a show of police authority (the
free-to-leave test) or be physically seized.193 Because the suspect did not
submit to the police officer’s attempts to stop him, “he was not seized
182. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
183. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991); see United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194, 205–06 (2002).
184. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200–01.
185. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.
186. Maclin, supra note 109, at 65.
187. Simmons, supra note 3, at 817 & n.216 (“This is probably a distinction without a
difference.”).
188. See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 16.03[B], at 266 (“The real issue for
courts is whether the police methods of obtaining consent are morally acceptable to us in view of
law enforcement goals.”).
189. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
190. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
191. 499 U.S. at 623.
192. Id. at 623–24.
193. Id. at 626–27.
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until he was tackled.”194 Subsequently, in Wardlow, the Court held that
“unprovoked” flight from police can be treated as suspicious conduct in
determining whether a subsequent seizure is supported by reasonable
suspicion.195
The doctrinal package resulting from Hodari D. and Wardlow can be
viewed as the Court’s assessment of the reasonableness of either police or
citizen conduct. As a determination of police reasonableness, the Court’s
decisions reflect the belief that there is nothing inappropriate about police
chasing people who run from them. As a determination of citizen
reasonableness, the Court reveals its belief that reasonable people, though
free to decline police cooperation, will do so through words of resistance
rather than through flight.
Whether examining the reasonableness of officer conduct or citizen
conduct, the Court’s inquiry into reasonableness in these contexts is not
completely divorced from the question of coercion. While reasonableness
provides an explanatory paradigm for consent jurisprudence, the
fundamental inquiry is still grounded in the coercion/consent dichotomy.
The Court may not examine voluntary consent from a subjective
perspective, but the Court does consider reasonableness from the
perspective of coercion: Have the police resorted to overly coercive
tactics, and would a reasonable person (as imagined by the Court) feel
coerced? It also analyzes reasonableness at a “micro” level, examining
the totality of circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine the
permissibility of an encounter or search.
C. Macro-Level Reasonableness
A different type of reasonableness inquiry is what this Article refers to
as “macro reasonableness.” Professor Orin Kerr explains the distinction
between the Court’s micro- and macro-level fact finding in Fourth
Amendment cases nicely:
A micro-scale inquiry focuses on the exact facts of the case
before the court, such as what the officer did or what
information he obtained. In contrast, a macro-scale inquiry
looks to characteristics of the general type of government
conduct, of which the case at hand is merely one example.196
Usually when the Court sets aside the warrant clause to focus on
reasonableness, it does so by balancing the interests of law enforcement
194. Id. at 629.
195. 528 U.S. at 125.
196. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 523
(2007). To illustrate the micro-level analysis, Professor Kerr uses an example of a police officer
who searches a suspect’s mail. At the micro level, the Court might examine whether the officer
violated any laws by examining the mail and the quality of the information obtained from the
search. Id. at 523 n.106. At the macro level, the Court might treat the case as just one example of
a larger set of cases involving searches of the mail and seek to develop a rule specifically
addressed to the privacy of mail. Id.
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against the level of intrusion to the individual.197 Consider Terry v. Ohio
as an example of the Court examining reasonableness at both the micro
and macro levels.198 Terry is best known for its holding that police may
conduct a brief, investigatory seizure of a person, without a warrant and
without probable cause, as long as the officer has a “reasonable
suspicion” that crime is afoot.199 An individual motion to suppress based
on Terry requires a court to engage in multiple determinations of
micro-level reasonableness. First, to constitute a seizure at all under the
Fourth Amendment, the circumstances must have been such that a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. 200 Second, to
constitute a Terry stop, as opposed to an arrest that requires probable
cause,201 the duration and scope of the stop must be reasonable in light of
the investigatory steps necessary to quell or confirm the suspicions giving
rise to the seizure.202 Finally, if the seizure does constitute a Terry stop, it
must be supported by “reasonable suspicion,” which requires the Court to
determine whether an “objectively reasonable police officer” would have
suspected that the suspect was engaged in criminal activity.203
Those micro-level reasonableness determinations arise in hundreds of
cases per day. However, the underlying reasonable-suspicion doctrine
stems from Terry’s initial, macro-level analysis of reasonableness. In
Terry, the Court considered—and rejected—two opposing regimes for
judicial involvement in brief, street-level investigatory stops: that they
should be treated as entirely outside the reach of the Fourth
Amendment,204 or that they should be subject to the default requirement
of a warrant based on probable cause.205 As to the former, the Court
197. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Cynthia Lee,
Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of the Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81
MISS. L.J. 1133, 1140, 1144 (2012) (describing the “reasonableness” balancing test).
198. See 392 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1968).
199. Id. at 24–26, 29–30.
200. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
201. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415–16 (1976).
202. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (ruling that in assessing the
reasonableness of the length of detention, the Court “consider[s] it appropriate to examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant”); id. at 691
(Marshall, J., concurring) (“Regardless how efficient it may be for law enforcement officials to
engage in prolonged questioning to investigate a crime, or how reasonable in light of law
enforcement objectives it may be to detain a suspect until various inquiries can be made and
answered, a seizure that in duration, scope, or means goes beyond the bounds of Terry cannot be
reconciled with the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause.” (emphasis added)).
203. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
204. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17.
205. See id. at 20.
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dismissed as “fantastic” the notion that a “stop and frisk” was of no
constitutional consequence.206 As to the latter, the Court recognized that
the nature of a stop and frisk required “necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat,” rendering
the warrant requirement impracticable.207 Rejecting a “rigid all-or-nothing
model,”208 the Court instead held that a stop and frisk implicates the
Fourth Amendment, but would be evaluated pursuant to the “general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”209
A generalized look at reasonableness requires the Court to balance the
governmental interests served by the challenged police conduct against
the level of intrusion to the privacy and liberty interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment.210 Applying this balancing test to stops, the Court in
Terry emphasized both the legitimate interests of law enforcement to
investigate suspicious circumstances that reasonably indicate criminal
activity, and the relatively brief detention of the stopped individual.211
Turning to the reasonableness of a frisk for weapons, the Court weighed
the legitimate interests of police officers in protecting their safety during
investigatory stops, and the limited intrusiveness of an inspection for
weapons.212
Importantly, the Court has expressly looked to the macro-level
reasonableness balance to shape the micro-level doctrine governing stops
and frisks on a case-by-case basis. Stops cannot take longer than
reasonably necessary because the government’s interest in quick,
on-the-spot decision-making decreases, while the level of intrusion to the
defendant increases.213 To preserve the reasonableness balance, the Court
will treat an overly lengthy or intrusive stop as a de facto arrest (thereby
triggering the probable cause requirement), even if the police officer does
not intend to elevate the stop to an arrest, or does not announce to the
defendant that she is under arrest. 214 The lawful scope of a frisk is
206. Id. at 16.
207. Id. at 20.
208. Id. at 17.
209. Id. at 20.
210. Id. at 20–21.
211. Id. at 22–24, 26.
212. Id. at 25–27.
213. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–88 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20
(“[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were ‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual
one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”).
214. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (providing that although Court precedent obscures the
distinction between investigative Terry stops and de facto arrests, “if an investigative stop
continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop”);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (holding that unlike the brief and narrowly
circumscribed intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny, “the detention of petitioner was in
important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest” where the petitioner was
transported to a police station in a police car, placed in an interrogation room, and questioned
without being told that he was free to leave); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969).
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similarly determined by macro-level considerations of reasonableness.
The moment a police officer begins to search for anything other than a
weapon, the reasonableness balance changes.215 The government is no
longer advancing its interest in officer safety, and the nature of the search
becomes more intrusive. Accordingly, the Court has adopted a bright-line
rule that the only legitimate aim of a frisk is to locate weapons.216 A
search for evidence, no matter how brief, changes the reasonableness
balance, re-triggering the default rule requiring probable cause and a
warrant.217
It is not only in the stop and frisk context that the Court looks to
notions of macro reasonableness to shape Fourth Amendment doctrine. A
macro-level balance of governmental interests against intrusions to
individual liberty and privacy is at the heart of the doctrinal rules
governing special needs searches, 218 roadblocks, 219 administrative
searches, 220 community caretaking searches, 221 inventory searches, 222
protective sweeps, 223 searches incident to arrest, 224 and an officer’s
215. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (contrasting frisks from typical searches because a “protective
search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable,
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person”); 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 17.07[B][2]
(“If an officer feels no object during a pat-down, or she feels an object that does not appear to be
a weapon, no further search is justifiable under Terry, which is based exclusively on the concern
for the officer’s safety.”).
216. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 26–27; Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 377
(1993); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that Terry authorizes a limited frisk
for weapons).
217. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (finding an officer’s search to be
impermissible under Terry where the justification for the search was to find narcotics rather than
to search for weapons); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325–29 (1987) (holding that probable
cause is required to search for evidence, even when the search is alleged to be cursory).
218. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–38, 340–41 (1985); O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 715–25 (1987) (plurality opinion); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 618–25, 627 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–72
(1989); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–59, 661–64 (1995); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14, 318–21 (1997); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
78–86 (2001); Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828–32, 834–36 (2002).
219. See Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–55 (1980); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–44, 46–48 (2000) (providing that the constitutionality
of checkpoint programs conducted by law enforcement “depends on a balancing of the competing
interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program”); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425–28
(2004) (balancing the gravity of the public interest served by the seizure, the degree to which the
checkpoint seizure advances public interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual liberty).
220. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967) (providing that in the
municipal code enforcement context—as opposed to the criminal investigation context—there is
no ready test for “determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails”); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543–46 (1967).
221. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439–43, 446–48 (1973).
222. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–76 (1976) (upholding the
reasonableness of administrative searches in light of the “distinct needs” served by such searches);
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643–48 (1983); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–76
(1987).
223. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331–37 (1990).
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directives that drivers225 or passengers226 exit a vehicle during a traffic
stop. In each context, the Court determined that the usual warrant and
probable cause requirements that serve as a default proxy for
reasonableness were inappropriate. In the absence of this requirement, the
Court turned to a macro-level determination of reasonableness by
weighing the governmental interests served by the category of search
against the nature and level of the intrusion to citizen interests. However,
when it comes to the consent-search exception to the warrant
requirement, the Court has silently bypassed this usual macro-level
balancing test to determine reasonableness. To be sure, some language in
Schneckloth appears to invoke a kind of balancing test. Specifically, the
Court noted the need to accommodate the “two competing concerns” of
“the legitimate need for [consent] searches and the equally important
requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.”227 But assessing the
level of coercion upon an individual is not the same as the Court’s usual
measure of Fourth Amendment costs to the individual: liberty and
privacy. Instead of citing the usual measure of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, the Court in Schneckloth expressly borrowed this
balancing equation from the Fifth Amendment case law that governs
police questioning. 228 That confession law has been built around a
compulsion/consent dichotomy is unsurprising given the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee that no person be “compelled” to be a witness
against himself. 229
However, the emphasis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are
different. The Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy and liberty
interests against unreasonable interference by the state. Moreover, the
default measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a warrant based
on probable cause.230 The standard of probable cause ensures that there is
some level of individualized suspicion to justify interference with a
224. In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), for example, the Court limited the ability of
police to search an arrestee’s car—incident to an arrest—to instances in which the defendant was
either arrested while still in reach of the car’s passenger compartment, or in which police had
reason to believe that the car contained evidence of the crime for which the defendant was
arrested. Id. at 335. The Court rejected a more expansive reading of the search incident to arrest to
preserve the proper balance between the government’s interests and the arrestee’s privacy
interests in his car. Id. at 344, 351.
225. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–11 (1977).
226. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411–15 (1997).
227. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
228. Id. at 227–28; see also id. at 280 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court assumes that the
issue in this case is: what are the standards by which courts are to determine that consent is
voluntarily given? It then imports into the law of search and seizure standards developed to
decide entirely different questions about coerced confessions.” (emphasis added)).
229. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
230. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 8.01; see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnotes omitted)).
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citizen’s privacy and liberty interests,231 and the requirement of a warrant
ensures that a neutral decision maker acts as a check on the discretion of
law enforcement, whose judgment might be clouded by the competitive
enterprise of crime-fighting.232 Though the Court has recognized so many
exceptions to the warrant requirement that the exceptions swallow the
rule, it has done so by looking at “macro reasonableness.”
In the consent context, however, the Court has treated the citizen’s
voluntary, consensual participation in an investigation as an alternative
proxy for reasonableness. However valid a citizen’s true, voluntary
consent might be to establish reasonableness, this Article demonstrates
that, as applied by the Court, the concept of “voluntary consent” is a
myth. The Court’s “fictional”233 measure of voluntary consent is not the
kind of true voluntary consent that would be required in the Fifth
Amendment confession context from which the Court borrowed the
doctrine. For example, in the confession context, Miranda v. Arizona234
supplements the core Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination by creating an irrebuttable presumption that custodial
interrogation is compelled unless the defendant first waives his Miranda
rights.235
While the Court has injected notions of Fifth Amendment compulsion
into the Fourth Amendment consent context, it has declined to require
proof of waiver, 236 proof that the defendant knew he had a right to
refuse,237 or even any showing that the citizen subjectively desired to
231. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949); see City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (noting “the general rule that a search must be based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (requiring
probable cause to believe an item may be seized in order to invoke the “plain view” doctrine, to
ensure against “a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
232. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1947) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment’s “protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
233. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
234. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
235. See id. at 444, 461 (“An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of
persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”); 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS,
supra note 2, § 24.04[C][1], at 443–44 (noting that a common reading of Miranda was that
compulsion inheres to custodial interrogation to such a degree that any confession is compelled in
that context, and therefore “in the absence of procedural safeguards . . . custodial interrogation
necessarily will—not simply can—result in unconstitutional compulsion”).
236. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 246 (1973); see supra Section III.A.
237. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2002) (“The Court has rejected in
specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to
refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”); Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 432, 435 (1991); Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 227.
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participate. 238 Instead, the Court resorts to objective notions of
“reasonableness,” arguing that reasonableness is the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment. 239 But the kind of “reasonableness” that silently
drives Fourth Amendment consent law is not the same kind of
“reasonableness” that drives the Fourth Amendment.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the dissent noted the difference between the
micro-level reasonableness emphasized by the majority in upholding the
search based on apparent third-party consent, and the macro-level
reasonableness that concerned the dissenting Justices.240 To the majority,
the search of the defendant’s apartment was reasonable because the
police officers, however mistaken, reasonably believed that they had
obtained voluntary consent from a person authorized to give it.241 Even
though several scholars have cited the Court’s third-party consent cases
as a clear example where the Court relied on notions of “reasonableness”
to approve a consent search,242 the dissent correctly noted that the Court’s
so-called “reasonableness” assessment (a form of micro-level analysis)
was not the traditional Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” assessment
(a macro-level analysis):
Instead of judging the validity of consent searches, as we
have in the past, based on whether a defendant has in fact
limited his expectation of privacy, the Court today carves out
an additional exception to the warrant requirement for
third-party consent searches without pausing to consider
whether the exigencies of the situation make the needs of
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Where
this free-floating creation of “reasonable” exceptions to the
warrant requirement will end, now that the Court has
departed from the balancing approach that has long been part
of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is unclear. But by
allowing a person to be subjected to a warrantless search in
his home without his consent and without exigency, the
majority has taken away some of the liberty that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect.243

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.
See 497 U.S. 177, 190 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 186 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3; Williams, supra note 8; Maclin, supra note 109, at

61.
243. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 198 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The dissent’s point is distinguishable from the argument made in this
Article, because the dissent did not question the lawfulness of a search premised on the
defendant’s own “voluntary consent,” a term that most commentators agree does not comport
with the Court’s application of that term.
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Because the Court has lost sight of macro reasonableness, it has failed to
look to the balance of governmental and individual Fourth Amendment
interests as it has shaped consent-search doctrine.
IV. CURRENT CONSENT SEARCHES: ARE THEY (MACRO-LEVEL)
REASONABLE?
Despite the recent scholarly attention to the shadow role that
reasonableness plays in consent-search doctrine, the Court has largely
overlooked the macro-level assessment of a reasonable balance between
governmental and Fourth Amendment interests. However, the Court’s
decisions reveal an implicit assumption that the doctrine it has created
under the myth of consent does, in fact, satisfactorily balance
governmental interests and individual liberty and privacy interests.
A. The Court’s Fondness for Consent
Professor Nadler has observed that the Court’s view “appears to be
that consent searches ought to be encouraged (or at least not discouraged)
because they reinforce the rule of law.”244 Professor Strauss has aptly
noted that “a laundry list of law enforcement benefits from consent
searches have been oft-repeated in the case law, with little real
discussion.”245 Professor Maclin has described the Court’s fondness for
the consent doctrine as “zeal to approve consent searches.”246 Consider,
for example, the Court’s evaluation of the interests at stake in
Schneckloth:
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit
activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of
obtaining important and reliable evidence. In the present case
for example, while the police had reason to stop the car for
traffic violations, the State does not contend that there was
probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was
incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the
search yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a
prosecution, and provided some assurance that others, wholly
innocent of the crime, were not mistakenly brought to trial. And
in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest or
search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search
may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves
fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that an arrest
with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or
that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not
justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may result in
considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search,
244. Nadler, supra note 9, at 210.
245. Strauss, supra note 1, at 265.
246. Maclin, supra note 109, at 30.
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and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and
wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.247
Notice the assumptions the Court implicitly makes in its cost/benefit
analysis. In first analyzing the benefit to the State, the Court uses the
example of a case in which the police rely on consent under
circumstances in which they would otherwise be unable to arrest or
search, and then found something incriminating. When discussing the
costs to the citizen, however, the Court uses an example in which the
police do have another basis to search or arrest, but a consent search that
yields nothing persuades them to leave the citizen alone. As a cost/benefit
calculation, the Court’s analysis is remarkable in its incompleteness.
First, by looking only at scenarios in which the police find something
incriminating when they otherwise would not, or end up exonerating
someone who otherwise was the basis of suspicion, the Court looks only
at the potential benefits of consent. Perhaps more importantly, there is no
reason to believe that these two scenarios make up the bulk of consent
cases. Looking only at the two types of cases mentioned, one would have
to believe that police suspicion is so inversely correlated with actual guilt
that they are very likely to find something when they suspect nothing, but
are likely to find nothing when they have reason to suspect something.
B. Macro Reasonableness: The 2x2 Matrix
A true reasonableness analysis of consent searches should examine
the costs and benefits of four different categories of cases, created by a
full consideration of the two distinctions the Court alluded to in
Schneckloth. First, as the Court has acknowledged in both the
free-to-leave and consent-search contexts, sometimes police rely on
consent to justify their investigation, even when alternative doctrines
would allow them to engage in the same conduct without the defendant’s
consent. Second, sometimes searches turn up something incriminating,
and other times they yield nothing. This two-by-two matrix results in four
categories of cases, only two of which the Court explored in Schneckloth.
The two scenarios explored in Schneckloth are: cases where evidence is
yielded (“guilty”) in a consensual action that otherwise could not occur
(“consent only”); and cases where no evidence is yielded (“innocent”)
when the action could have been justified by another doctrine (“consent is
redundant”). The other two categories of cases are: cases where evidence
is yielded (“guilty”) when the action could have been justified by another
doctrine (“consent is redundant”); and cases where no evidence is yielded
(“innocent”) in a consensual action that otherwise would not occur
(“consent only”).
247. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted). Similarly, in explaining that the “community has a real interest in encouraging consent,”
the Court reasoned that “the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and
prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly
charged with a criminal offense.” Id. at 243.
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Guilty (G)

Consent is Redundant (CR)
[unaddressed in Schneckloth]

Innocent (I)

Addressed in Schneckloth:
No cost to D. Possible benefit if
D is spared arrest once
exonerated.

545

Consent Only (CO)
Addressed in Schneckloth:
“Free” evidence
[unaddressed in Schneckloth]

1. Consent Only/Guilty
Consider first the two boxes of the matrix discussed in Schneckloth
(G/CO and I/CR). In the upper-right-hand corner are consent searches
that yield incriminating evidence where police lacked any other
justification for inspection (G/CO). This is the heart of what the Court
sees as the benefit to the current jurisprudence, where the government
gets “free” evidence against the guilty. There are two problems with
placing too much weight on this upside to consent searches. First,
because the current doctrine does not require the government to specify
its reasons for requesting consent,248 it is impossible to know how many
consent-search cases are consent-only searches, and how many consent
searches would take place regardless of the doctrine. 249 Accordingly,
courts that uphold “other justification” searches under the doctrine of
consent may overstate the evidentiary benefit of the doctrine because the
officers likely could have conducted a search through another exception
or by obtaining a warrant. Second, even when consent searches truly yield
“free” evidence, a “macro” look at reasonableness requires those gains to
be balanced against the considerations of individual liberty and privacy.
2. Consent Redundant/Innocent
As to consent searches that yield no evidence when the police had
alternative justifications for investigation (CR/I), the Court assumes these
searches benefit the defendant because they may persuade the police not
to do something more intrusive, like conduct a custodial arrest to trigger
the search incident to arrest doctrine. 250 Once again, this reasoning

248. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine,
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 536 (2001).
249. See Maclin, supra note 109, at 32–33 (describing the Schneckloth Court’s claim that
consent may be the only means to obtain evidence as a “naked assumption without empirical
support”); Strauss, supra note 1, at 261 (“Consent searches often are used in circumstances where
the police also have probable cause to search, but don’t want to go to the ‘trouble’ of getting a
warrant.”).
250. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, police are allowed to search an arrestee and the
area within his immediate reach for weapons and evidence, without either a warrant or probable
cause to search. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 772–73 (1969); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 355 (2009) (applying Chimel to searches of automobiles incident to arrest and stating
that “the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

546

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

overstates the benefits to law enforcement and understates the costs to
privacy. First, the scope of a consent search may be broader than another
justification.251 For example, consent to search an automobile is presumed
to include the trunk,252 while a search incident to arrest of one of the car’s
occupants would include, at most, the passenger compartment of the
vehicle.253 Similarly, reasonable suspicion that a lawfully detained person
may be armed and dangerous justifies a frisk for weapons, but an officer
might instead ask the suspect for permission to search his pockets,
without limiting the scope of the search. Second, if police would have
conducted the search anyway, but are relying on putative consent, there is
nothing for the affected person to challenge. Because there is no basis for
challenging the search, there are no repercussions to the officer for having
formed an inaccurate suspicion, and these are precisely the cases where
we should want police correction.
3. Consent Only/Innocent
That leaves the two boxes of the matrix that were unaddressed in
Schneckloth. The lower-right-hand box is the simplest and holds the
clearest disadvantages to Fourth Amendment interests. When police
engage in a consent search with no other justification, and the search
yields nothing (CO/I), there is no advantage to the government in finding
“free” evidence, as the Court in Schneckloth emphasized for CO/G
searches. And unlike searches where no evidence is found, but consent is
a redundant justification to search (CR/I), the individual is not being
spared some more intrusive police conduct pursuant to another exception
to the warrant requirement. In cases where the individual’s consent is
truly voluntary, there might be no significant cost to privacy, but we have
seen that the Court’s consent doctrine does not require true consent, only
the reasonable appearance of it. 254 Accordingly, compared to the two
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search”).
251. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1, at 5 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that one
“benefit” of consent searches is, “At least when the consenting party does not carefully condition
or qualify his consent, that the search pursuant to consent may often be of a somewhat broader
scope than would be possible under a search warrant” (footnote omitted)).
252. United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1233 (1991) (“Consent to search a car means to search the entire car and whatever is in it, unless
such consent is otherwise restricted.”); see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (rejecting
state court holding that “if the police wish to search closed containers within a car they must
separately request permission to search each container” and holding instead that the search may
extend to particular containers if the consent given “would reasonably be understood to extend to
a particular container”).
253. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (limiting police authority to search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest to cases in which the
arrestee is within reach of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, or when police
have reason to believe that the car contains evidence of the crime for which the arrestee is in
custody).
254. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 212–23.
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categories of cases discussed in Schneckloth, this box of the matrix
appears to contain nothing but costs.
The only arguable benefit conferred by CO/I searches is if they
prevent police from needlessly investigating the individual further. 255
However, this argument rests on two questionable assumptions. First, it
assumes that one unsuccessful search will suffice to halt a police
investigation, which may not always hold true, especially where there is a
basis for police suspicion. Second, it assumes that if an individual refuses
to consent, the police will continue to investigate, which may not always
hold true, especially when there is no basis for police suspicion. In sum, a
CO/I search confers benefits only when two conditions are met: police
suspicion is such that the police would have continued to investigate
absent the consent search, but then discontinue the investigation once the
consent search yields no evidence.256
Consent-only searches also carry the heaviest implications for equality.
When there is no other justification for the search, the odds are higher that
police are requesting consent, either consciously or unconsciously, based on
racial or other stereotypes. 257 Data demonstrating that “hit” rates for
searches are lowest when police search people of color support this
inference.258
Though it is impossible to know what percentage of consent searches
might be supported by some other justification, there is every reason to
believe that most consent searches fall within this cost-heavy CO/I box.
First, the number of consent searches as an absolute number is high,259
and the overwhelming majority of them yield nothing incriminating.260
Moreover, the higher the frequency of consent searches, the less likely

255. For example, even in the absence of any other applicable exception to the warrant
requirement, police could engage in a number of investigatory strategies that fall outside the scope
of a “search” or a “seizure” as the Court has defined those terms. See supra Section I.A.
256. This Article’s normative recommendation attempts to retains this benefit by permitting
consent searches that are based on reasonable suspicion. See infra Part V.
257. See Steinbock, supra note 248, at 536–37 (noting that “consensual encounters are more
likely to be used against minorities and the poor”); George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a
New Approach to Consent Searches, 73 MISS. L.J. 525, 551–52 (2003) (noting that because
police “can approach anyone on the street to ask for consent and can ask any driver who is stopped
for a traffic infraction for consent, police are presently free to use race, and only race, to decide
when to ask for consent in a huge number of situations”).
258. See David Cole, Profiles in Policing, 26 CHAMPION 12, 16 (2002).
259. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
260. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1656 (noting a “staggering shortfall between the
enormous burden [consent] searches impose and their fruitfulness”); Nadler, supra note 9, at 210
& n.198 (“The vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.”); see, e.g.,
Chanenson, supra note 13, at 458 (“The vast majority of consent searches in the highway context
appear to yield no evidence.”); Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic
Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1, 23–24 (2001) (using data from Ohio to demonstrate that 10,000 consent searches took
place per year during routine traffic stops, with only two to four percent of searches yielding
evidence of wrongdoing).
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they are to result in evidence.261 It only stands to reason that consent
searches conducted with no other justification are the least likely to yield
evidence.262 Nevertheless, the Court has failed to consider the overall
costs of these searches to Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
4. Consent Redundant/Guilty
Finally, in the upper-left-hand corner of the matrix, are consent
searches that would have been lawful without consent, and which yield
incriminating evidence (CR/G). As an initial matter, one might wonder
why a police officer would request consent if another justification would
support the search. Because current doctrine does not require any level of
suspicion or other basis for requesting consent, a common philosophy is
that, regardless of whether police have cause to search, it does not hurt to
ask.263 Indeed, police are commonly instructed that requests to search are
not only harmless, but smart practice.264 As previously discussed, if there
is no other justification to search, consent may be the only option.265 Even
when police have another justification to search, consent is so frequently
given, 266 and so easy to prove, 267 that it will always be in the
government’s interest to seek consent rather than risk a failure to prove
the presence of the alternative justification. As one leading police
resource suggests, “It’s always a good idea to have at least two ways to
skin the search-and-seizure cat.”268 Accordingly, it is common for police
261. See Steinbock, supra note 248, at 536 & n.145.
262. Indeed, though empirical evidence is limited, it appears that consent searches that take
place in contexts where suspicion is lacking are, as expected, unlikely to yield incriminating
evidence. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(observing that in bus sweeps absent any particular suspicion, “the percentage of successful drug
interdictions is low” despite the fact that the police may engage in a “tremendously high volume
of searches”) (citing United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving a
sweep of 100 buses that resulted in seven arrests)); United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 500
(2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., dissenting) (noting that searches in the absence of any particular
suspicion by the DEA at the airport in Buffalo, New York, produced only ten arrests among 600
detained travelers).
263. See, e.g., Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 190 (noting California Attorney General’s advice
to peace officers).
264. See, e.g., id. at 190 (noting that officers are trained to ask for consent, even when they
have other authority to search); Devallis Rutledge, Consent Searches: Extracting the Rules from
17 Supreme Court Decisions, POLICE MAG. (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/
channel/patrol/articles/2013/02/consent-searches.aspx (describing consent as an “excellent” legal
justification for searching); ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, CONSENT SEARCHES 1
(2007), available at http://le.alcoda.org/publications/files/CONSENTSEARCHES.pdf (advising
police that “seeking consent to search for evidence is not only harmless, it’s often smart”).
265. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“In situations where the police
have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence.”); ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 264, at 1 (noting that “when
officers lack probable cause for a warrant, a consent search may be their only option”).
266. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 85–99 and accompanying text.
268. Rutledge, supra note 264.
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to seek consent for searches they would likely conduct, regardless of
consent, pursuant to one of the many other exceptions to the warrant
requirement.269
At first blush, any search with consent and an alternative justification
that also yields incriminating evidence (CR/G) would appear to be
cost-neutral to individual Fourth Amendment interests. Even without
consent, the police would conduct the search and discover the same
evidence pursuant to the other justification. Indeed, having these searches
occur via consent rather than the alternative justifications conceivably
confers practical benefits. A growing body of literature on procedural
justice teaches us that when people perceive a decision-making process to
be fair, they are more likely to accept the outcome of that process, even if
the decision itself is adverse.270 These lessons suggest that suspects who
believe they were given a choice in whether they were searched might be
more likely to perceive the search as being legitimate271 and therefore less
intrusive on their Fourth Amendment interests. Having these searches
upheld under the doctrine of consent may also result in efficiencies in
litigation, avoiding the uncertainties of doctrines based on fact-specific
standards like exigency, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion.
However, applying the consent doctrine to searches that police would
have conducted even absent consent also extracts costs, and these costs
vary depending on whether the individual grants or refuses consent.
Consider first the situation in which the suspect refuses to give consent
that would have been redundant to another justification. The police,
because they have other grounds for search, will likely conduct the search
anyway. That search will be lawful, but notice what the individual is
likely to learn from this experience: that a request for consent to search is
269. For example, because the government successfully argued in Drayton that the
defendants were free to leave and voluntarily consented to be searched, the government never had
to articulate either reasonable suspicion to support a seizure or probable cause to justify a search.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199, 203–04 (2002). However, by the time Drayton
provided consent to search, police already knew that he was dressed in heavy, baggy clothes on a
hot day and was traveling with someone who had already been tied to drugs. Id. at 199. Rather
than hold that any seizure of Drayton was justified, the Court instead reasoned, “The fact the
officers may have had reasonable suspicion does not prevent them from relying on a citizen’s
consent to the search.” Id. at 207.
270. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME
& JUST. 283, 286 (2003); Tom Tyler et al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures
Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 913, 923, 925 (1996); see TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 196 (2002) (“[P]eople’s main
consideration when evaluating the police and the courts is the treatment that they feel people
receive from those authorities.”). See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83–90 (1971).
271. Research demonstrates that people are more likely to be satisfied with a process when
they have been given an opportunity to participate by expressing their side of the story. Tom
Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 94 (2004);
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm:
Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 380–81
(2003).
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no “request” at all. This commonplace practice creates a feedback loop
that adds to the perception—dismissed by the Court as
unreasonable—that people do not have an actual choice in whether to
submit to a so-called “consent” search.272
Now consider the suspect who grants consent to a search that police
would have conducted anyway. For example, the suspect might be
lawfully stopped, and the police officer might believe there is reasonable
suspicion to justify a check of the suspect’s backpack for weapons,273 but
she might request consent to search as an alternative justification. 274
Similarly, the officer might believe she has probable cause to justify the
search of a car under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement,275 but nevertheless asks for consent to search. As discussed
above, if the officer’s beliefs that she has alternative grounds to search are
correct, then relying on consent imposes no additional costs and arguably
benefits perceived fairness and certainty.276 However, what if the police
officer’s beliefs are wrong? If the only reason the police officer requested
consent to search was because of unfounded suspicions, the
consent-search doctrine creates a mask that conceals the underlying
problem. Reliance on consent deprives a reviewing court of the ability to
serve a teaching function by assessing the legitimacy of the officer’s
suspicions.
The role consent plays as an “easy” justification to search is a final
cost of the doctrine that the Supreme Court has overlooked: its potential,
if unrestrained, to swallow the remainder of the Fourth Amendment
landscape. The Fourth Amendment’s “essential purpose” is to “shield the
citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.”277 The presumptive
method for determining whether an intrusion into privacy is justified is to
require a warrant based on probable cause.278 Moreover, to control police
discretion and avoid the dangers inherent in a “general warrant,”279 the
warrant must describe with particularity the “place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”280 Even in the many circumstances in
which the Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,
272. See Barrio, supra note 137, at 247 (“[T]he authority behind the officer’s request to
search will often indicate to suspects that they have no choice but to consent, leading them to
authorize searches otherwise forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.”) (footnote omitted).
273. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6–7, 10 (1968); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049
(1983).
274. See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text for a discussion of why police may
request consent even when they have an alternative justification to act.
275. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 147 (1925); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592, 592–95 (1974) (plurality opinion).
276. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
277. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); see also New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 464 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
279. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (“The principal evil of the general
warrant was addressed by the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement . . . .”).
280. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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those exceptions are supposed to be narrowly construed.281 This principle
“carries with it two corollaries:”282 first, a warrantless search must be
“strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible,”283 and second, in recognizing an exception to the
warrant requirement, the Court should “carefully consider the facts and
circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons
supporting the exception.”284 Following these corollaries, the Court has
recognized numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, each with
its own scope, drawn to reflect the justifications underlying the exception.
However, these supposedly important corollaries cease to exist when
it comes to consent. Instead, police may always request consent, without
ever having to justify the request. And once they obtain consent, the
Court’s ongoing enterprise of trying to restrain police discretion to search
becomes irrelevant.285 Because nearly everyone consents, the police can
almost always bypass not only the default warrant requirement, but also
its carefully delineated exceptions.286 Moreover, because there need be
no justification for a consent search beyond the granting of consent, the
scope of a consent search is potentially endless.287 Consent searches, as
currently defined, are the exception that swallows every other Fourth
Amendment rule. 288 This undermining of the Court’s taxonomy for
defining the “reasonableness” of a search is yet another hidden toll the
consent-search doctrine exacts on Fourth Amendment interests.
V. PUTTING REASONABLENESS BACK INTO CONSENT
Scholars have no shortage of advice on how to improve the
consent-search doctrine. Some have advocated eliminating the
281. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393–94 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971); Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
282. Belton, 453 U.S. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
283. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
284. Belton, 453 U.S. at 464.
285. See George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison
Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1505 (2005)
(stating that the strategy of obtaining consent “has proved so successful that it has largely replaced
other justifications for searching a suspect such as incident to arrest or in a Terry stop and frisk”).
286. See Thomas III, supra note 257, at 541 (“Consent is an acid that has eaten away the
Fourth Amendment.”); Rebecca Strauss, Note, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way:
The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 876–77 (2002) (“The
Court has held that when the subject of a search voluntarily gives his consent, it is reasonable for
a police officer to conduct a search without a warrant.”).
287. See Strauss, supra note 286, at 876 (arguing that “[c]onsent searches come dangerously
close to general warrants by giving the searching police officer undue discretion to determine the
scope of the search”).
288. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (rejecting the government’s
argument that a defendant who was taken to a police station was not seized because “any
‘exception’ that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable
cause”).
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consent-search exception altogether. 289 However, given the Court’s
fondness for the doctrine, 290 the Court is unlikely to abandon the
consent-search exception.291 Moreover, it is difficult to argue with the
underlying rationale for the doctrine in a (perhaps rare) situation where
the searched individual truly wants to be searched. 292 The challenge,
however, is to reshape the doctrine to mirror the “reasonableness” that is
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.
A. A Role for Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
Part IV drew on a macro concept of reasonableness and argued that, as
currently implemented, the consent-search exception extracts high costs
to individual privacy without corresponding benefits to law enforcement.
Most scholars who have advocated reforms to the doctrine have focused
on reducing the level of the intrusion on individual privacy by attempting
to ensure that the search is truly voluntary.293 For example, scholars have
advocated that police use written consent forms, 294 that requests for
consent be videotaped,295 or that magistrates be used to ensure that a
person’s consent is voluntary.296 Most commonly, scholars have argued
that police should be required to warn people they have a right to refuse

289. E.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 258–72 (setting forth the “radical solution” of
“eliminating consent”); Lassiter, supra note 7, at 82 (proposing elimination of the fiction that
motorists ever voluntarily consent to searches during traffic stops); Thomas III, supra note 257, at
551–52 (discussing the benefits of “abolishing consent searches” vis-à-vis racial profiling); see
Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1618 (noting that “one solution would be banning consent
searches altogether, though it is not necessary to go that far”).
290. See supra Section IV.A.
291. Maclin, supra note 109, at 78–79 (noting the current Supreme Court “will never ban
consent searches”); see Strauss, supra note 1, at 271 (characterizing elimination of consent
searches as a “drastic solution”).
292. For example, one could imagine a person volunteering for DNA testing that would
exonerate him when he knows his community suspects him of wrongdoing.
293. Burkoff, supra note 7, at 1139–41 (proposing a standard requiring awareness of the
right to refuse consent as a predicate to voluntariness); Maclin, supra note 109, at 79–80
(proposing a prophylactic rule that would better ensure the voluntariness of consent searches by
barring the police from further seeking consent once the subject has already refused); Rotenberg,
supra note 11, at 179–80; see also Nadler, supra note 9, at 214, 221–22 (criticizing the Court’s
consent-search standards as a “sham” that “struggles against a wealth of social science evidence,
that subjects many innocent people to suspicionless searches and seizures against their will”).
294. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 364 (2001) (“All
consent requests should be recorded, and all consents should be in writing and signed by the
driver, passenger, or pedestrian who was stopped.”). But see Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi,
Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 751, 778–83, 790 (providing that
although consent forms provide an essentially dispositive effect on the determination of consent
voluntariness, “in reality [consent forms] are no better a guarantee of voluntariness than oral
warnings”).
295. Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 294, at 792–93.
296. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1663.
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consent.297 However, warnings are unlikely to be a panacea. As an initial
matter, they simultaneously say too little and too much. A warning that
the individual has a right to refuse does not make clear, for example, that
his refusal to cooperate cannot be used against him, that he has the right to
limit the scope of the search, and that he can revoke consent at any time.
The warning may also not be true if the police are seeking consent as a
redundant justification to another exception to the warrant requirement,
such as a search incident to arrest or a Terry frisk.298 Moreover, empirical
evidence demonstrates that, just as most people waive their Miranda
rights, consent-search warnings have very little effect, most likely
because of the inherent social authority that comes with police
interactions. 299 If anything, consent-search warnings are likely to
increase the number of searches upheld under the doctrine, because
courts are likely to view the warnings as dispositive evidence that the
resulting search was voluntary.300
Without detracting from efforts to narrow the consent doctrine to
include only those searches that are truly consensual, this Article’s
emphasis on the traditional Fourth Amendment view of reasonableness
suggests an alternative method of improving the balance between
governmental and individual interests. Other scholars have also looked to
the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone of reasonableness to shape Fourth
Amendment doctrine generally. For example, Professor Christopher
Slobogin, has offered a “reconceptualization” of reasonableness using a
principle of proportionality: “A search or seizure is reasonable if the
strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of
intrusion associated with the police action.”301 Professor Cynthia Lee has
proposed a multi-step process of “reasonableness with teeth,” under
which courts would review the reasonableness of warrantless searches by
297. E.g., Gallini, supra note 2, at 236–37 (advocating reversal of Schneckloth to require
police to warn people they have a right to refuse consent); Chanenson, supra note 13, at 464 &
n.398, 465–66 (arguing that, despite the potential utility of warnings to be “oversold,” warnings
nevertheless cannot hurt); Hemmens & Maahs, supra note 13, at 346 (arguing that officers should
be required to advise citizens of their right to not cooperate); Lassiter, supra note 13, at 1182–94
(encouraging states to use their own constitutions to implement several consent-search reforms,
including warnings about the right to refuse consent); Whorf, supra note 13, at 410 (suggesting a
rule that people be told they are free to leave before police ask for consent to search).
298. For a discussion of the use of consent as a redundant justification, see supra
Subsections IV.B.2, IV.B.4.
299. Lichtenberg, supra note 5, at 360–61, 363–65, 367 (discussing the relationship between
police authority and subjects of consent searches and finding that over 88% of drivers gave
consent to search when asked before implementation of a Robinette warning and approximately
92.2% gave consent after the warning).
300. See Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 294, at 778–83, 790 (criticizing the “essentially
dispositive effect” that courts place on written consent forms in determining the voluntariness of
consent, because written consent can still be coerced).
301. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21 (2007); see also Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call
for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1998);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1991).
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assessing the nature of the intrusion into privacy, whether the police had
probable cause, the practicability of a warrant, and whether the police
acted in bad faith.302
However, unlike the scholars discussed above, the Court has lost this
focus on reasonableness from a Fourth Amendment perspective in the
consent-search context because of its emphasis on the coercion/volition
dichotomy.303 To return real reasonableness to consent searches, courts
should consider the reasonableness of a consent search in light of Fourth
Amendment values, rather than only by the supposed voluntariness of the
consent. Despite the Court’s focus on volition, current doctrine leaves
room for a requirement that individual consent searches must also be
reasonable in light of a balance between the individual and governmental
interests at stake.
As an initial matter, all searches must be executed reasonably. The
reasonableness requirement, “[i]n each case[,] . . . requires a balancing of
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
that the search entails.”304 Accordingly, even searches that are authorized
in theory can become unlawful if they are not reasonable at a micro level.
For example, searches conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable
cause carry the hallmark of reasonableness; nevertheless, the search
would be unlawful if police searched an area too small to contain the
object of the search, or if the police failed to knock and announce their
presence prior to searching. 305 Similarly, the Court has announced a
bright-line rule that it is always reasonable to detain people who are on
the premises when a search warrant is executed,306 but the reasonableness
of using handcuffs to achieve the detention must be litigated on a micro,
case-by-case basis.307 The standard used for determining the lawfulness
of strip searches is further evidence of a prevailing requirement of microlevel reasonableness. In addition to a general justification to search, strip
searches must also be reasonable under the circumstances.308
Though the Court has discussed reasonableness in the consent-search
context primarily through the consent/volition dichotomy,309 remnants of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness are discernable. For example, even if
the officer obtains consent that is deemed voluntary, the search is
nevertheless unlawful if the officer goes beyond the scope to which a
reasonable person would have believed she consented. 310 Especially
302. Lee, supra note 197, at 1137, 1144, 1181.
303. See supra Part III.
304. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (emphasis added).
305. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
306. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–05 (1981) (holding that the extent of
force used to detain persons on premises must be made on a case-by-case basis).
307. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 111 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
308. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558–59; Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633,
2642 (2009).
309. See supra Part III.
310. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991); see also Tim Sobczak, Note, The
Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine: The Constitutionality of Passing Consent from an Informant
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illustrative of Fourth Amendment reasonableness’s vitality in the consent
doctrine is the Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph.311 In Randolph,
a wife called the police about a domestic disturbance and then told the
responding officers that her husband, Randolph, used cocaine. 312
Randolph denied his wife’s accusation and claimed she was the one with
a substance abuse problem.313 His wife then volunteered that there was
evidence of her husband’s drug use in their house.314 After Randolph, a
lawyer, “unequivocally refused” a request for consent to search, his wife
“readily” provided it.315
Existing doctrine suggested that the resulting search was lawful.
After all, the Court had already held that searches were reasonable if
based on the voluntary consent of a co-occupant.316 Indeed, relying on a
“reasonableness” model, the Court had extended the consent search
rationale even to those cases in which the party granting consent did not
actually share common authority over the premises, but merely appeared
to.317 Nevertheless, five Justices held in Randolph that the police acted
unreasonably by searching Randolph’s home with only his wife’s
consent.318 The Court distinguished earlier third-party consent cases as
involving non-consenting parties who were either not present when the
third party consented,319 or were present but had not expressly declined to
give consent.320 Looking to “widely shared social expectations,”321 the
majority reasoned that people who choose to live with others assume the
risk that their co-occupants will invite others in, but not while one
occupant is physically present and expressly objecting to the entry:
[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared
premises would have no confidence that one occupant’s
invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a
fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without some
very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under
those conditions.322

to Law Enforcement, 62 FLA. L. REV. 493, 502 & n.72 (2010) (“The Court in Florida v. Jimeno
held that the scope of consent is determined through a standard of objective reasonableness, that
is, what a reasonable person would believe the limits of the consent were.”).
311. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
312. Id. at 107.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
317. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
318. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23 (“[A] physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of
consent to police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”).
319. Id. at 106, 121 (referencing Matlock, which involved the defendant detained in a nearby
squad car).
320. Id. at 106, 121 (noting that in Rodriguez, the defendant was sleeping inside when police
relied on apparent authority of another party to search his home).
321. Id. at 111.
322. Id. at 113.
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It is for good reason that Professor Maclin has declared the Court’s
decision in Randolph “good news” for consent-search jurisprudence.323
The decision examined the defendant’s social expectations not only
vis-à-vis his co-occupant/wife, but also with respect to the police who
were asking to search. It was not only reasonable for Randolph to expect
his wife not to invite someone in after he had objected; it was also
reasonable for him to expect the police not to rely on her consent, even if
she gave it.324 Reading Randolph more broadly, one could view the Court
as scrutinizing not only the voluntariness of the consent (which
Randolph’s wife’s consent surely was), but also the reasonableness of the
government’s request in asking for it. Would a reasonable person, having
been rejected entry by one member of a household, attempt a second bite
at the apple with another, while the objecting party was still present?
Apparently she would not.325
B. A Glimpse at Reasonable Requests for Consent
Though the Court in Schneckloth stated that consent searches served a
“legitimate need,”326 this Article demonstrated in Part IV that the Court’s
conclusion was based only on a macro assessment of reasonableness, and
a wholly incomplete one at that. To inject Fourth Amendment
reasonableness into the consent doctrine, courts assessing the
reasonableness of an individual consent search at a micro level should
consider not only any coercive tactics used to extract consent, but also the
reasonableness of the request for consent to search itself. Determining the
reasonableness of the request would involve judicial scrutiny of both the
government’s reason for asking for consent and the scope of the consent
requested.
As the Court has recognized in myriad other contexts, “[t]he test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application.” 327 Generally, to balance the
government’s needs against individual privacy rights, courts should
“consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
323. See Maclin, supra note 109, at 67. Providing a thoughtful and thorough analysis of
Randolph and its precedents, Professor Maclin found the Court’s emphasis on Randolph’s
express refusal to consent especially important. Id. at 78 (connecting the emphasis on Randolph’s
refusal to give consent specifically to Justice Kennedy’s tie-breaking vote). Building on this
emphasis, Professor Maclin advocates for a per se rule against requesting consent after an
individual declines a first request. Id. at 80.
324. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113.
325. In Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014), the Court refused to extend the
holding of Randolph to a case in which the defendant objected to a search, was then taken into
custody, and therefore was no longer present to object when his co-occupant consented. Id. at
1129–31. Though the Court found that the police acted reasonably in Fernandez, and
unreasonably in Randolph, both cases evince a willingness to scrutinize the circumstances
surrounding a request for consent to search in determining the search’s reasonableness.
326. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
327. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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conducted.” 328 Applying these factors to consent searches, a court
assessing the reasonableness of a request for consent to search should
consider both the reason for the request and the requested scope.
1. The Reason for the Request
Many of the more troubling consequences of current consent doctrine
can be attributed to the fact that police do not have to articulate any reason
at all for requesting consent to search.329 As long as there is no limit to the
ability of police to ask for consent, there is no limit to the overall number
of consent searches police can seek. As a matter of privacy, the odds that
these searches will affect wholly innocent people are highest when police
lack any basis to suspect that evidence will be found in the search. As a
matter of equality, without a requirement that police articulate a reason
for requesting consent, it is impossible to know whether they are relying
on impermissible factors such as race. These costs in the Fourth
Amendment balance would be reduced if police were required to
articulate a legitimate reason, beyond mere curiosity, for the request.
Importantly, under the proposal presented in this Article, the
government’s reason for requesting consent would not have to be
sufficient to justify a search in the absence of consent. Clearly, if the
police already had a basis for searching (e.g., a search incident to arrest or
probable cause to search an automobile), those justifications would be
sufficient to search, and would render a (redundant) request for consent to
search reasonable, as long as the scope of the search was also reasonable.
This Article simply proposes that the request for consent be reasonable,
and that courts could look to other Fourth Amendment contexts for
guidance regarding the reasonableness of the request.
For example, usually the standard of suspicion required for a search
for evidence is probable cause; the lesser showing of reasonable
suspicion justifies only an investigative stop and accompanying frisk for
weapons. 330 Nevertheless, even some critics of the consent-search
exception to the warrant requirement agree that it is reasonable for police
to request consent when they have a reasonable suspicion that they will
find something. 331 Though the level of suspicion alone would be
insufficient to obtain a warrant, the government would at least have some
328. Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975),
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
329. See Steinbock, supra note 248, at 536; United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201
(2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual,
they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
330. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366, 372–73, 375 (1993).
331. See Lassiter, supra note 13, at 1191–92 (citing cases that recommend a requirement of
reasonable suspicion to support consent searches).
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level of individual suspicion—an important component of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.332
Another example of a reasonable request for consent to search is
where the purpose of the search is to protect public safety. Take Florida
v. J.L.333 as an example in which concerns about public safety, though
themselves insufficient to justify a warrantless search, would render a
request for consent reasonable. In J.L., police received an anonymous
phone call claiming that a young black man wearing a plaid shirt at a
specific bus stop was carrying a gun.334 When police arrived at the bus
stop, they saw J.L., who was wearing a plaid shirt.335 Based only on that
information, police stopped and frisked J.L.336 The Court held that the tip,
standing alone, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion,
because it was wholly anonymous, with no indication of the source’s
basis of knowledge or veracity. 337 Alternatively, the government urged
the Court to recognize a “firearm exception” to the requirement of
reasonable suspicion, permitting police to stop and frisk based on any tip
alleging unlawful gun possession.338 The Court declined to create such an
exception.339 Though it was not reasonable to search J.L. solely on the
basis of the anonymous tip, such a tip could be offered as a reasonable
basis for requesting consent to search. 340
Another situation in which requests for consent to search are
reasonable is where the discretion of individual officers is otherwise
limited. A central goal of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent the
government from exercising “standardless and unconstrained discretion”
in picking and choosing whom to seize and search. 341 Though
individualized suspicion is the usual rule that limits police discretion,342
the Court has recognized alternative methods as adequate. 343 For

332. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 41 (2000) (characterizing
individual suspicion as an important predicate to most searches permitted by the Fourth
Amendment).
333. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
334. Id. at 268.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 271, 274.
338. Id. at 272.
339. Id.
340. Professor George Thomas, who would prefer to eliminate the consent search exception
to the warrant requirement, would permit consent searches that advance the government’s interest
in public safety. See Thomas III, supra note 257, at 557.
341. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
342. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (describing individualized
suspicion as a constraint on police discretion); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41
(2000) (referring to “the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of
individualized suspicion”).
343. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654–55 (noting that in “situations in which the balance of
interests precludes insistence upon some quantum of individualized suspicion”—such as
probable cause or reasonable suspicion—“other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure
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example, police might drug test every employee involved in an
accident344 or stop every fifth car that passes through a DUI roadblock.345
Typically, the Court has limited searches without suspicion to activity
advancing a government interest that is qualitatively distinguishable from
ordinary law enforcement.346 Here again, however, the limit on discretion
is not being used as a justification to search, but simply as a factor in
determining the reasonableness of the government’s request to search.
Requiring police to articulate their reasons for requesting consent to
search would reduce some of the larger costs of these searches to Fourth
Amendment interests. First, it is likely to reduce the number of requests
that are motivated by racial or other prohibited factors. Current doctrine
does not provide a basis for uncovering the role that discrimination may
play in so-called “consent” searches, because the entire focus is on the
voluntariness of the consent, with no scrutiny of the request itself. If
police know they will be required to articulate a reason for requesting
consent—whether it be some basis for suspicion, some concern for public
safety, or pursuant to some systemized approach that limits officer
discretion—they may avoid engaging in race-based consent searches. In
this respect, a court’s insistence upon a reason for requesting consent
resembles the ability of litigants to force lawyers to articulate a reason for
exercising a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror. 347 The
reason itself need not rise to the level necessary to strike a juror for
cause,348 but the process of requiring the lawyer to state a race-neutral
reason is intended to serve as a method of both deterring discrimination
and detecting it where it exists.
Second, consideration of the officer’s reason for requesting consent
will return at least some role of education to the subsequent motion to
suppress. Currently, consent serves as a “mask” for other potential
justifications for the search. For example, the police may believe they
that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the
official in the field” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
344. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
345. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990).
346. For example, the Court has upheld administrative searches in the absence of suspicion,
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511–12 (1978);
“special needs” searches, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666, 675 (1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20;
inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–76 (1976) (upholding the
reasonableness of administrative searches in light of the “distinct needs” served by such searches);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 375–76 (1987); community caretaking searches, Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447–48 (1973); and roadblocks that advance a primary purpose that
is connected to highway safety, Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 561–62 (1976).
347. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that peremptory challenges
based on racial discrimination violate the Fourteenth Amendment and creating a three-step
process for determining whether a peremptory challenge is based on prohibited discrimination).
348. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that what is
required is a clear and reasonably specific explanation of the legitimate reasons for using the
peremptory challenges).
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have probable cause to search an automobile349 or reasonable suspicion to
support a stop and frisk. 350 If they seek and obtain consent, the motion to
suppress can be resolved on these grounds, without the court ever having
to address—and without the officer ever learning—whether the other
grounds were legitimate. If police were required to articulate their reasons
for requesting consent—and if these reasons were actually sufficient
grounds to search, standing alone—a court would likely rely on these
grounds to uphold the search because the voluntariness of the search
would then be irrelevant. Even if the reasons, standing alone, were not
sufficient to search, the police officer would at least learn whether the
reasons were sufficient to justify a request to search, and this may
improve the officer’s conduct in the future.
At the same time, courts would learn more about the real-life
dynamics of consent searches. Once police have to articulate their reasons
for requesting consent, courts may recognize that at least some of these
requests are based on race or other discriminatory factors. They will also
learn that police often ask for consent even when they intend to conduct
the search regardless of whether they obtain consent. If courts realize that
sometimes police search even after an individual declines consent, that
information might inform subsequent judicial decisions about the real
“voluntariness” of consent.
2. The Reasonableness of the Scope
The reasonableness of a request for consent to search should take into
account not only the officer’s reasons for asking for consent, but also the
scope of the consent that she requests. For example, a police officer with
reason to believe someone is carrying contraband could reasonably
request consent to search for drugs. An officer searching to protect public
safety could reasonably request consent to search for weapons. A
department concerned about drug transportation on its highways could
request consent to search from each, or every fifth, motorist stopped
lawfully for a traffic infraction.
Consider, in contrast, a tactic one police officer asked this author, at
the time a prosecutor, about many years ago: If neighbors believed a
house was being used to sell or manufacture drugs, a standard police
response was to visit the house for a “knock and talk.”351 This officer,
however, had added his own gloss to the practice, and wanted to make
sure it was permissible. If the suspect had a prior drug record that might
indicate he was too savvy to consent to search, the officer, instead of
asking for consent to search for drugs, would ask for consent to search for
349. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 149 (1925).
350. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10–11, 27 (1968); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049 (1983).
351. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1423 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (using the
term “knock and talk” to refer to the practice of “knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an
occupant for the purpose of gathering evidence”).
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“any jewelry that shouldn’t be in the house.” He described the practice as
remarkably effective and even suggested a reason why: The suspect was
so relieved to be asked about something he did not do that his immediate
instinct was to cooperate; once he consented, he would fear that any
backpedaling would be seen as suspicious.352 And it was not coincidental
that the officer used jewelry as the stated object of the search; because
jewelry is small, the scope of the resulting search would be sufficiently
intrusive to turn up any drugs that might be on the premises.353
What the officer wanted to know was whether this practice was
lawful. Was it? The Supreme Court has made clear that, in general, the
Constitution does not prohibit police officers from using deception.354
Though the Court has not specifically addressed the use of deception by
police officers requesting consent to search, lower courts permit deceit as
long as it does not render the consent involuntary under the totality of the
circumstances.355 Indeed, police officers are even instructed that there is
no per se prohibition against using trickery to obtain consent.356 If the
only consideration is the voluntariness of the consent, the “ask for
352. See supra notes 113–14 for a general discussion of the fear that refusal to cooperate will
be seen as suspicious.
353. To be clear, as long as the consent search for jewelry was valid, any drugs found could
be lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, even though their discovery was far from
accidental. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 135–36, 140 (1990) (removing
inadvertence as a necessary condition of a valid plain view seizure and further providing that a
plain view seizure is justified where: (1) “the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed”; (2) the item’s
“incriminating character [is] ‘immediately apparent’”; and (3) the officer has “a lawful right of
access to the object”).
354. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies
by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 778–88 (1997) (noting the considerable leeway afforded by the
Court to the police in the undercover context and further noting the pervasive use of lying and
deceit by officers in the search and seizure context); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing
Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979) (detailing and analyzing the prevalence of trickery or
deceit in police practices in the absence of clear constitutional standards and in the absence of
“definitive guidance from the Supreme Court,” especially considering the Court’s voluntariness
doctrine).
355. See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L.
REV, 425, 429–32 & nn.15–44 (1996) (cataloguing lower court cases upholding deceptive police
tactics and the confessions therefrom, despite the fact that the police lied about the strength of
their case, fabricated evidence, lied about the extent of the suspect’s culpability, and lied about
circumstances of the interrogation).
356. See id. at 427–28 & n.10 (“[P]olice interrogation manuals and police seminars
recommend police lying, virtually ensuring that each new police officer is familiar with the
technique.” (footnotes omitted)); ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 264, at
24–25 (setting forth, in a prosecution memo, “consensual entry by trick” tactics, such as
misrepresenting the officer’s identity and employing false friends, which tactics will likely “not
invalidate an entry or search because . . . a suspect’s consent need not be ‘knowing and
intelligent’”); Frank Connelly, Consent to Enter or Search by Deception, FED. LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., 1–3, available at https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/impo
rted_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-subject/4th-amend
ment/ConsenttoEnterorSearchbyDeception.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (training manual
regarding the use of deception to obtain consent to search).
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jewelry” practice would appear viable in the absence of any coercion used
to overcome the person’s ability to refuse. Nevertheless, at the time, this
author warned the officer that a court offended by his conduct might look
to the overarching Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness to
declare the search unlawful.
Again, Randolph proves a helpful comparison. The wife’s consent
was voluntary; the problem was that it was unreasonable to ask her for it
or rely on it. Just as social norms suggest that “no sensible person” would
walk into a home while one of its co-occupants was present and telling
her to stay out,357 no sensible person would walk into someone’s home
when the invitation was based on the visitor’s lie about her reasons for
entering.
CONCLUSION
For all the role that “reasonableness” has played in the consent-search
exception to the warrant requirement, the Court has focused on
reasonableness through the lens of a coercion/volition dichotomy
borrowed from Fifth Amendment doctrine governing the voluntariness of
confessions. The traditional notion of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness—requiring a balancing of government and individual
interests—has been lost in the noise. This Article has attempted to return
Fourth Amendment reasonableness to the consent doctrine in two ways.
First, this Article assessed the reasonableness of consent searches at a
macro level, examining the governmental interests served by consent
searches and the impact on individual privacy. This analysis revealed that
the Court, to the extent it has undertaken a macro examination of
reasonableness at all, has overstated the extent that consent searches
advance governmental interests and understated their toll on individual
privacy. Second, to make consensual searches more reasonable at the
macro level, this Article has argued that courts should assess not only the
voluntariness of the consent to search, but also the reasonableness of the
request to consent itself. This micro-level examination of reasonableness
will allow courts to determine whether the resulting search does in fact
bear a reasonable relationship to the government’s need for engaging in
it.
Aligning consent-search doctrine with traditional conceptions of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness would drastically change the way that
law enforcement views and is trained regarding consent searches.
Currently, consent is seen as a “free-for-all,” in which it “never hurts to
ask.”358 Police can request consent to search anything, and the resulting
search will be reasonable as long as the consent appears to be voluntary.
If, instead, police officers know they will have to articulate their reasons
for asking for consent and the logic behind the scope of the search, then
357. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006).
358. See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text.
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the resulting searches are more likely to be truly reasonable, at both the
micro and macro levels.
One disadvantage of “reasonableness” assessments generally is their
inherently inexact nature. In many contexts, the Court has opted for
bright-line criminal procedural rules because of their clarity and
predictability.359 While bright-line rules bring clarity and predictability,
standards like “reasonableness” are indeterminate and require
case-by-case decision-making.360 When it comes to consent searches, the
Court has repeatedly “eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing
the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”361 This Article’s
proposal, accordingly, does little to shift the position of consent-search
doctrine along the rules–standards spectrum. The Court is already using a
flexible, fact-intensive standard; this Article simply calls on the Court to
apply the correct one: a standard of Fourth—not Fifth—Amendment
reasonableness.

359. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition:
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 365 (2004)
(“[T]he need for bright-line rules was married to the reasonableness model of the Fourth
Amendment, and the Burger Court had found its paradigm for searches and seizures.”); Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1479 (1985); Wayne R.
LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141–42; Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 34, 39 (2009).
360. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
594, 596 (1992); John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 996
(2014) (“A legal rule has the advantage of clarity and comprehensibility over a standard, other
things being equal.”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–89 (1976) (describing the value of rules that are “formally realizable,”
as distinguished from a “standard,” which occupies the “opposite pole” and typically requires an
ex post fact-specific inquiry); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (noting that a standard “tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact
situation,” while a rule “binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of
delimited triggering facts”).
361. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (reversing lower court for using a bright-line
rule to determine the voluntariness of consent when the person granting it had been stopped by
police).
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